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PHOSSCUTION I'illBj;

01T_'^_CRIMI,^AI,I^_0P TI®
HlC'-i^ WALTKHJR

jCniroduction

Defendpit H, W^lthei: D^-rj-e is aqcuqed of (l!) planning, prepar
ing,

Imaging wars of aggression an^ the inraslonq qf other

countries; (2) participating in the common plan and conspiracy to carry
out wars of aggression; (s) the conimisslon of war crime's end crimes
_

^

against humanity; and (4) memhership in the criminal organizations.

The accusations are set forth in the charges of the Indictment under
which Darre has "been indicted, namely, Counts I, II, V, YI, YII and VIII.
1.

J

Pollt-ic^l Biography pf_Ifef^ndant_D^r0

Born in the Argentine of German parents 14 July 1895, Defendant
Darre returned to Germany in 1905, wher© he conpleted most of his educa

tion (exchange student to England) and has resided until the present
date. As early as August 1930, Darre was the personal adYisor to Hit—
•ler on questions of agriculture, later appointed Reich Minister of Rood

' and Agriculture and Reich Peasant Loader, retaining "both positions from
r-

•if

1933 to 1945 (on official leayo from 12 May 1942). Darre's Party record

shows memhership in the HSDAP from 1930, In the SS from 1931, in the

Reichstag from 1932, end in the Leadership Corps from 1933 (Leader of
Reich Office for Agrarian Policies until 12 May 1942 end momher of the

staff of Reich Leader SS from 13 September 1958 to January 1945). SS •
activities of the Defendant included service as Chief of Rcace and Settlorneiit Main Office from 1931 to 1938, during which time ho attained the

rf'nk of SS-Ohergruppenfuehrer. Defendant Darre in his sworn stateraont
of 29 October 1947, sumraPrlzes the biographicf^l material received in evi
dence as Exh. 995, ]!n:D-l3213, DB 101 at page 1.
2,

Fo^itions withAn_the_Third_R0ich

The positions of importcnoe occupied by B'-'-rre during the Third
Reich are set forth in the printed edition of the Indictment at page six
1

-
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V-
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• • ii-r

(6).

Chief among the poaition^= hold <"ro (l) P,pich Minister of Food and

Agricaltnrc, (3) Reich Peasant LoP-der, (s) Reich Lender of Office for
Agrarian Policies, (d) Chief of SS-Raco and Sottlomont Main Office,
(5) Prussian Minister of Agriculture, (6) i^omber of Reichstag rnd inomher

of Prussian State Council, nnd (?) President of 5npromo Hereditary F- rm
y
Court.
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Sxh. 996,
Exh. 998,
:3zh. 931,
Fxh. 932,
Bxh,2653,
Bxh.26^4,
Bxii.1004,

I

.^

•t '-./l*!

HID--12218, LB 101, pagvo 3
HID-1^^975, LB 101, ppge 8
HII)-13674, LB 117, pAgc 27
ilir)-13240, LB 117, page 36
l:TC-4729, LB 95, ppgo 27
HG-4728, LB 95, ppgo 30
NG-1762, LB 101, pfgo 36
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Portinent Pn.r?"gr-"phs of Indictment:
1. 6, 13, nnd SI

Background

*Prosocution Docuiiiont Books Ko» 101 rnd 103 contain tho Gxhi"bits

portaining to thn aBovo portion of tho Indictment and havo established
tho following fr-ctsj

Do.rro, in the years prior to 1933, di^-ftod his plans for tho rog—
i/

iraonta-tion of German agriculture in support of th® HSBAP.
^

Those plans,

originally intended as secret mr'ttor a,nd not for general puhlication,

finrlly rppoared in the form of the "Reich ffood Tlstato Law", It was adso
during this early period that Ba.rro announced his theory of Germany s
right to expand'hocauso of the immodicato need of the. Gorman people to
secure more and more agricultural producing territory.

In answer to tho

quostion of whore this additional torrltory was to "bo found, Darro

pointed to the ^ast as tho natural territory immediatoly arailahlo^ for
the relief of tho overcrovrdod Gorman population, for tho development of

his e3^p^nsionist theories, and as possessing the agricultural possihilities nocossary for the feeding of the German people. Ba.rro emphasized
the fact that in Germany there wa.s one political Party - and only one "

that clearly recognized this right of Germany to ospa.nd and also possesaod
the courage required to nccottpllsh this ta-sk —tho Pr^rty of Adolf
/

Hitler.

Beginning in 1933, Darre omhhrkod upon his course of developing
Gorman agriculture and Building up the SS-Raco and Sottlemont Ma.ln

•, -'k

1/ E3(h. 999, HG-448,
LB 101, p. 16
2j Exh.XOOe, NIL-13333,DB 101, p. 34
Bxh.1007, HIL-13190,LB 101, p. 51
See also Basic Information.

^

Bxh.lOOO, HII)-13369,LB 101, p. 23.
•Sec also Exh. 1285, NG-1334i I® 7CVA, Tr. 2866
-
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In the formor ho sot rts his gool the IndopondGnco nnd solf-suf-

1/

ficioncy of G-ormp-ny in food production,

.

^

wherons in tho l*^ttor his on—
2/

Joctivo was the creation of an elite group, destined "by racial favor to
"be the future loadore of G>;rmany.

This period immediately following 1933

represents a general effort hy the loading llazis to consolidate for the
the gains so rpcqptly i^fon.

With the edvent of 1935, a "broader progr-am for dovoloping Gor-

, mary^s military strength, wag designed to regain Gerraony^s former pres
tige •'^jnong the nrtions of Europe.

Darro is identified with this general

progra,in; on 16 March 1935 ho signed the law instituting con^ulsory
military servico and fixing the ostahlishmont of the German ormy at a
3/

poaco-time strength of 500,000 men in violation of the VGrsailloa Treaty.

Five days later his powers end duties togothor v;ith thoso of the Chan—
cellor rnd other Ministers wore defined in the Secret Reich Rofonso Law —

a law propruring for the dPy v/hen Gormary should 'bocomQ involved in war.
Of this period, the Judgment of the IMT states,
"It is clear from this law that "by Moy of 1935
Hitler end his govornment had arrived at the

stage in the carrying out of their policies when
it was necessary for them to hevo in existence

ir.'

fin

the requisite machinery for the administration
and govornmont of Germany in the event of their

policy loading to wnr."^

Darro then concerned himsqlf with questions of foreign exchange

In relation to Gorman armaments, as woll as for the purpose and tasks of
6/
the Four Year Plan.

As a result of the infornia.tion obtained from those

matters, Darro. adjusted his own plans according to Goering's advice

>

given while explaining the reason for creating the S'our Tear Plan,"All moasurns have to be taken just as if wo

wore actually in tho sttUgo of imminent danger
of war." 2j

I '*

life''

2j

Exh. 1008, NID-13322, DB 101, p. 54

2j

Sxh. 995, NXD-12213, DB 101, p.

1

Exh.

3

996, 5nD-128l8, DB 101, p.

^

Bxh, 1026,

^
^
6/

Exh. 545, PS-8261, DB 31, p. 12
IMT, Volume I, page 184
Bxh. 1027, iIG-1217, DB 102, p. 15

PS-1654,

7/

Bxh. 940,

BC--416,

DB 102, p.

1

• DB 118-A, p. 46

^

4 -

i

Dcixre, not BP.tisfiod with the rP-to of prograos "being mado, wrote

to Hitler (5 Soptomhar 1936) rdvocAting n stronger nnd more centrallzod
Gconomic londcrship to incraasd thv^ affectironoss of the economic pre1/

ppx'itiona for wpt.

r. -

In his ov/n field of food and p^riculture, Drrre,

particularly in his speeches to the Reich Peasnnt Oouncil and to the
members of the Eeich Food Ecta.te, stressed the role of the Gormrn pofv-

sont in contri"butlng to thoso preppnritionB, explained the task sot for
them ajid statod his dotorinlnation to achieve tho goal of the comploto

preparation for vrar in respect to agricultural products.

Darre wa^ so

conscious of tho propara-tion for and ohjoctiyes of tho inponding war that
ho wrote to Hitler (3 Doccmhcr 193?) urging the immedia.ta roliof of tho

agricultural workers' shortage in Sastorn (Jormnny end giying as the al—
tomativo his opinion:

"Then the iio^ct war is already lost "boforo the
first shot has "been fired." ^
Darr_G Adini_s8_ions_on War Preparation
Dnrro does not dony that ho enga-god in war preparations prior

to 1 SoptomhJr 1939. on tho contr-Ty he ha^ only .praise for his porsnnrJ.
accomplishjnonts in coirpleting this task. His pride in contributing to
t

Hitler's war is reflnctod in a letter of 28 February 1942. wherein he
sta.tod:

"In a gig&ntic effort before 1939 I created tho

requisite wMch made it possible for the Fuehrer
to wage this war at all from the point of view of

food." ^
Wo are indebted to tho Defendant Darre for a review of his con- .
'A

tributions to tho pre-war preparations. His personal review is sot forth

In a report to Gooring and Hitlor. 29.irovembor 1939.

Darro stated:

"The vjhole work of rgrprlan policy since the seizure

of power was already dominated by tho preparation for
X! Bxh. 1038, KG-1900. DB 102. p. 20

2/ Exh, 1029. H(>-1174, DB 102. p, 23
Hxh, 1030. NG- 450, BB 102, p. 27
3/ Exh. 45B, 110-2305, DlB 29-A. p. lOO
^
Exh. 1048, HID-12720, 3B "iOS. p. 136
^

Exh. 1043,

NG-453, KB 102, p. 109
-

6
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a possible wf-r.
which occur in

For'in prf^-ctico ril tho difficulties
war (block'''-cl0), if not so acute, plrordy

osiBtod froLi 1924 duo to tho constant lack of foreign ox-

cliango, And so since 1934' the Battln of Production has, boon
carried on with those slogans which guarantoe tho security

of production.

Those slogonn ^ I should like to oniphasizG

this - -aro today Just ai docisiwo

they woro then ''nd thoro

wa-s no need to alter thori during tho past years and even today

thoy nood not bo changod at all. I a,ttributo this to ny work
and' that of % collabpra-toi:s whiqh procpoded not:; from the in

dividual caso bv|.t fro!:i" general prlnciplGS.I'^

This rp.pq^rt contains the aim of D-'-rro^s work within tho field of agricul

k:ture and is outlined as follo\tfs:

"The aim of our v/hole v/ork: Battle of Productinn by means

f

of the tiarketing Order was to see th"t no ba.Bic ^change

should take place during the war since such a change could

no longer bo a.ccorrplished dnid_ weuld_ p,arry_
seed of coll?k)BO.

ihp_

II.

"For this reason I have "set up in the report, wliich I sub

mitted to you on the 21 February 1939, three principles? 1. production must be brou^it to the highest level of
efficiency before tho war,

2. During the war evor-thing must be done to ensuro that
production does .not fall off (adoquato supply of pro
duction equipment, labor, horses, otc,)»
3. As far as possible, steels must be accumulated in order
to counterbalance certain setbacks in production Cbad

harvests, fluctuations in th-e ha.rvost and a certain
falling off in production duo to the absenco of oilcakes, Intormodiate crop seeds etc., loss of territcrios.)
"Tho fact th^t Germany could enter this war vdth its supply
position
position as
as i
itt iis,
s , dopsito
aopsieu tho hoavj' demands »•.—
made on
-- agriculturo for a period of many yoars, is duo primarily to the oiforts of the agrarian soctor in tho Battlo of Production.

r

Eoncofp.rthj_ ^ho i.s^uG dop ^nds p.n_onsurin^ and mainiaping ^

The widost_pqssible_extpnt tho dogrpo^of intnnsity rlrooxL^
attaunpd_^" ^

Da-rro in the report st-tod above actually is roitora ting his statomonts
of an earlier date as sot forth in his publication of 1937 ontitlod

"Tho Swino Murder", the prdfaco of whicb. containod tho following statomont:

"Tho World W-^r has shown us tha.t the oxistonco of a nation
can bo undorminod even mono from tho food sido than by
_

...

jx

T1

"hn

f>inrr

actual war actions. E'er this reason, it will lo clear that

tho food oconomy is of onormous iraportanco from a national

and political aspect. If I doscribo in tho o ow ng
troatiso a fateful blunder mado in tho food oconony du ing

1/ IMd., p,
^ Ibid.

110

- 6
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2' liiiiitti

^

f

tho World War, n'^raoly tho "Swino Mur^.or 1915", I do so in
order to "benefit from tho ox-nerionco gained in the food

economy in the World Wf^-r,

Hcrohy it is not only nocessexy

to represent tho rolr.tod f^cts end effects of tho Swino Mur

der on food economy r.s ,vtg11 e.s politically, "but ' Iso to
illuminate strongly the poisonel element "behind tho scenes.
Tho investig^'tions into the Sv;inn Murdor hP-vo, thGreforc,

not "boon initiPtod purely for historic interest," ij

It was in the srrae "book th-et DPrrq st^^tod hip viewp on totP.l wpj::
'

.

I

t

,

U

.

•

\J

.

!

.

~

~ <

llTotPl war is not pnly ?- questiop of superiority of ^rms

\

bu^ first. Pnd foremost a quostibn of an ensured food
siroply." ^

Derro o^ain roviowod his work in tho PgrariPn field and stated that:
"From tho "beginning, tho German food econony has worked ac

cording to principles which can "bo applied succossipilly in

more difficult times without ahsolutely nccessitrting tho

appearance of the disadvantages of a govornmGnt-controllod
economy as was the case with the former war food economy. As
the -oroduction of agricultural products, in contrast to in

dustry, cannot "bo increased or cut down" at vdll, sometimos
lajTgor quantities of a product appear on tho market, and some
times smaller onos depending on tho season. The tasks of the
storago Gconoiry carried out "by tho Reich Pood Pstate togothor
v;ith the con^etont Reich authoritios consist soley of putting
into cold storage thoso qu-ntitios of "butter and eggs available
in larger quantities in spring, so that thoy cr.n be put. on tho
maTkot in winter when thoy arc sc-arco, to cover the^domand.
The same holds true of boef rnd pork as well as grain. In
ca-so of a. largo supply, tho surplus will likowiso bo put in
Cold storago and warohousos by tho Reich Offices or stored
in tho form of ca.nnn.d goods. Thus, conditioned by the Na
tional Socialist Marketing Order, we are ca-rrying out a

storago. econony which makes the a.irman food supply to a.

largo extent independent of supplies from abroad,' ^

Darro in discussing th.^ exporioncos gained during World War I sta.tod:
"o) Arbitrary price incroasos , such a.s happonnd during tho
la-st vjar, will bo provontod by tho same National Socialist

Marketing Order, Because of tho abolition of the Producoexchango there exists noith r a. forvrard transaction nor cU
s-oeculativo, fictitious trade. Because of the complete mer
ging of all food producihg and distributing ontorprisos in

tho Roich Pood Bstato, those bocamo subject to price control.
largo oxtont by tho creation of a, system of fixed prices, or

%

-y

Bosidos aprico profltocring can bn provontod tcdey to a

of ZZL - pid guiding - prices, for tho most vitnl pro-

ducts

such as grain, milk, butter, meat, potatoes, etc.,so

th.--t those ahusos, which appeared in this sphere during the
World War are hardly to ho foarod. Tho Agricultural Mre^kot-

ing order ensures however hy its .tor,age economy th-t a
•posDihle scarcity of goods and an automatically rosulting
ySxh. 10,47. mB-12498, SB 103, p. 130
^ Ibid., p. 121
S/ I^i«i., p, 123

- 7 -
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•

"blfxck mr-rkot with cxcossiTo. pricos will "bo provontGd n.s much ^
Gs poEsihlG hy "bringing n, greater supply onto thu market,
namoly from the stocks of the so-callod Reich Offices. Tho
"butter shortage of 1935, during v/hich the price for dairy
"butter was v/ithout exception kept at 3,20 RM per kilogram,
proved tha-t the system of the Marketing Order will function

in an omorgcncy, ov.on if there is a shortage of commoditins."^
The a'boye report is corro'Doratod "by the colla'borators of Darre as

evidenced "by p. speech pf Mipistorial Riroctor Moritz and confirmed "by

Ijlp ^tual preparations made in the light of O25porioncos of I'^orld War I
and put into operation at the outbreak of the war.
.'V-,

Moritz in a lecture of 14 Hovomhor 1939 stated:

"The measures which wore to prepare the Reich for the event
of war had to procood from the thesis of a total war, The
food economy formed a decisivo sector within the framework
"In the field of organization, the administration of the food
cponoity and the agricultural--organization had al^roady "boon con^
"binod at the top after the soizuro of power, in thrt the posi»^
tions of Reich Minister end Reich Peasant Lender wore hold "by

the same person.

At the beginning of the war, the Reich Offices,

whoso chief teak is to bo soon in making commercial dispositions,
particularly also in the balrncing of seasonal and business cycle

fluctuations, wore merged with the Centml Marketing Associations
which arc in charge of the rdrainistrative dispositions of the
commodities.

The Regional Peasant issociations vctq entrusted

with the functions of the Regional Pood Offices,

Within these

wore established a. Division A ,for the regulation of production

and a Division B for the administrative disposition of the
food economy, A corresponding moa.suro was taken in the case
of the County Peasant Associations,

"Through the preparatory meaauros in the fields of production
and administration, the food situation at the beginning of tho
war was such, that tho German Reich, including tho Ostmark and
tho Protectorate, was indopondont of inports for as much as 84^,

This proportion of 845b of our food requirements mot from doraostic
sources and only l6}o dependent on imports corresponds roughly to
the food situation in Prance, while Great Brit-'^in can supply only

85^ of its food requiromonts fron domestic sources and is depen
dent on imports to the extent of 757?," ^

2j Ibid.

gj Bxh. 1045, NG-938, DB 102, p, 116

K,

.

of those preparatory measures.

N'.'

'w^r"

ST05AG3 ??.0GEAM

SCOiTOMIC MOBILIZATIOH

5'Lmi:^£2^ of_Ar^5marit

With rospoct to Dario's pp.rticip'''tion in tho planning, prepara
tion, initiPvtion and waging of aggressive war, tho ovi4GnQO qho^fs that
ho suhstantially participated in organizing and mobilizing tho food
economy of Gormany with knov/iedgc th-'t tho program was directed to

propaxation and waging of aggressive war.
Wo have indicated that in tho overall considoration of this

case, each of the defendants was given a spocializdd field of activity
and v/ithin that specialized field the military and economic machinery
of tho Third Hoich was creetod and developed in order to launch and
wage tho aggressive war horoin charged.
The defendant Ba-rro was Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture,

He wa.s as Reich Ponsant Loader also tho ho"d of tho Reich Pood Sstato, an
organiza,tion which included and controlled fa.rmors, agricultural workers,

food processors and food dealers.

Occupying those high political and

administrative offices, tho defendant Barre proceeded to organize tho

agricultural oconoray of Germany as part of the proparatibn of tho Third
Roich to wag3wors of aggression.

Prior to 1938, Barre as a Minister of Hitler's cabinet wa^ in
formed generally of the economic mobilization measures taken by tho Third

Roich.

1938 marks the year when Btirro's specialized activities wore so

accelerated p.s to charge him with knowledge that he was no longer en

gaged in normal peace time activities insofar as mobilization of tho
food economy of Germany was concerned.
It was in 1938 that Barre engaged in an extensive food stock

piling program, particularly grain, tho details of which arc referred to
in this record as the Grain Stor-'^ge Program,

In its essence,this pro-

grnra required an abnormal expenditure of money for stockpiling domestic

and inported grain and for th:: construction of warohouse and stor'^go

-

•I

II dil '•Mtf'rtl'S >fl'l till ' I

I
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facilitios.

Tho spociPl tining md accolorr-tion of this Gtocki>iline

progrr,m -bocomcs significr.nt duo to tho fr.ct thnt in Fcl:ruoxy 1939 (a
montli prior to tho invasion of Bohomio and Moravia) tho dofondant Earro
had a Spooial survoy mado of tho grain rosourcos and rosorvos for tho

express purp6so pf asoortaining tho availahlo food supply in tho ovont

of an iBEipdjatq outhreaJc Of wax. As p result of this au^oy, the dofon4snt Earro took additional administrativo noasures to assure an adoquato
supply of food for tho ovontuality of war. Earro admits that this sur
vey was undertaken upon an order hy Gonring directing Barre to inform
hira of tho nocossP.ry roservos in food for conducting

wtX,

Another ospocinlly striking foaturo of tho grain stcrago pro-

A'

gran, which indicatod that its purpose w-as directly connected with
preparation for war is the fact th^t tho cost of the construction pro
gram was so a-bnorma.1, that in the summer of 1939, tho defendant von
Krosigk, tho Reich Tinanco Ministor was compolled to inform Earro on
tho rocord, that such huge oxpondituns of public monoy was oconomioally
unsound and that it v/as substantially cutting into the funds availablo

for tho military. ,Von Krosigk know (as well as Earro) th t this progran was under Goering^s gonoral diroction as Plonipotontiaiy Gonor,!.
of tho Pour Yoar Pla.n, which called for mobilization of tho ontiro

economy for war and Krosigk in his corrospondonco noted that tho stock
piling -nd storrgo facilities progriim was to build up war reserves for

food. Ho was unsuccessful^in reducing the exponditurns in connootion
With this progrpa.

In addition to the grain storage program Earro dovolopod a food

rationing program and worked out all of its administrative details to
. bo invoked in the evont'of war. On the point of knowledge of tho aggros.

Bivo plans of tho Third Eoioh, wo call attention to th f
fivo
days boforo the invasion of Poland, Earro by dooroo put into effect tho
food rationing program throughout Gorman;'- and sot in notion
alaborato administrativo mach-inery with ration coupons, etc.

o timing

of this particular activity can load to no conclusion other than that
-

10 -

Larro in his spocialirod soctor hr'-d kno^flodt;^ of th-i ^^{-Tossivo propr^
rations against Poland '^nd particrpatad^in his spocializod field in the
propana.tion for aggrossiY-^ van,

4

inothor foaturo of Prnro^s special activity in tho ocononic no"bilization for vmr was his authority as Reich Peasant loadGr over tho

mohilization of a^icultural and rolatod workers.

In the mobilization

planning qf the raanpowor of G-nrina.ny," Darre was given authority to sot
up a dcformont system insofP-r as it Wc?,s fpplicPhlo to agriculture, and
through his offices he developed and administered mobilization of the
agricultural nanpowor for war.

I.,

Grai^ ^"tprago. Program
Background

To understand properly tho importance of tho Grain Storr^o Pro
gram in relation to Germany's aggropsivo war plans, considora.tion must

be given to one of Hitler's basic aims, tho conploto indcp.-^ndenco of
u
Groator Germany from foreign sources of food supply.
With the assumption of powor in 1933, came the decision to
roviso the Gorman grain economy bj' placing tho emphasis upon increased

production.

In order to a.cconplish this independence a two-fold pro-

grajs wa.s a.doptod, whereby

1) Gormehy increased domostic production through intensi
fied methods of farming, thus supplying tho majority
of hor needs from indigenous sources, and

2) Germany sought to gain additional agricultural spaco
beyond her borders which tho Gorman peasant could cultiva.te as soil of tho Reich and whicli was nccosS'^Ty to

conploto froedom from food inserts.

The dovolopnont of this prograni began with tho Battle of Produc
tion in 1934, but since Germany was not capable of supplying its ontiro
food domand from domostic sourcos, tho problem of securing additional

agricultural space soon confrontod tho Nazi gov'irnment.
2j Sqg Count II, n.

In solving

for In^ortance of food supply to Hitler's

program.

-11 -
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this iP.ttor phpse of thn prohlom Gormpny crmo to v/pj: with tho major

powers of tho world, hut only after dovolopine tho first phase which was
to make G-ormauy indopondont in its food supply through tho stoclopiling
2J

of food rosorvos ond pp.rticulc'^-rly gr^in rosorv.os.

Igricuiturf^l production ^ono could not solvn tho problem of

Germany<s sQlfrSuff|Biqngy. ffihp
hotwoon
insuring thQ pGRsant (f^rnor^ o.n adoquato and St^hlo price and supplying
I

the ordina.ry consunor at prices that ho could afford. Principles of
supply ajid demand were replaced by a Bystem of con-plox regulations of

production, markoting and prices which became known as tho Agricultural
Ma.rkoting Order, Duo tO' this system of fixed grain prices which wore
gradually increased with tho passing of every month after tho haxrost.
thoro aroso a demand for an institution which would buy tho grain from
tho aathorizod dealers, store it and resell it in the final stage or

rat tho pnd of the grain economic year (l Aujnist to 31 Jnly) . This in
stitution was tho Hoich Office for Grain.' Foodstuffs and Othor Agricul
tural Products, a public corporation established under this nano in
May 1935, Herbert Dossier was selected as the president of this offico
and rornainod so until 1942.

Arflong tho tasks of tho Hcich Offico for Grain, etc., was the

buying 0^ domestic grain which when it appeared upon tho nanket could
not bo absorbed immediately by the trade, and storing it until its re—
salo which usually occurred towards the end of the grain economy year,
Tho Eoich office had not a legal but an actual monopoly on grain im

ports because of tariff regulations and bocauso reduced duties wore ap

plied to its imports. Due to the elimination of speculative grain trade,
grain oxchruge end the ehortags of foreign exchange for grain iriports, i
n.i

.

the Eeich Office for Grain assumod an incroaslhg importance to the German

2J Bread-grain was selected for stoclsplling becruse of l) its i:^ortance to the German diet. 2) its storage

V

bo carried over a. long period of time and 3) i s sui conversion into fat and mocat through ^hc stomach o
-

Hferi f TiV I
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12 -

- or

^ p g.

grain oconomy, ospoeialljr so since its stock'boc-''oo the laain p-rt of
the so-called transition stocks which wore neoosscTy to tide ovor the
nation from one harrost to r.nothor;. Horr.ir.ily the transition stock for
Germany was cstiuatod to ho from 1.6 to 2 million tons.

Beginning with the ppor harrost of 1937. tie Eeich Office far
Grain, qtg,, ^JOgan tp p^ry a more lgpo's|«»t

iR

oconon^., It was at this time, in an effort to save as much grain as possihlc, that its feeding to livostook was prohihited. It was also a.t this
•time that foreign exchange for grain imports was made ava.ilahlo in order
to satisfy the demand created hy the rather small harrcst.
B.

•f

Hoc d__f^r_Sio

The grain hanrcst of 1938 was a humpor crop in Germany which
amounted to a record 26,183 million tons, almost four (4) million tons

higher than the harrost of 1937^ As a. result of the measures adopted
during tho grain harrost of 1937 and the humpor crop that followed in
1938, there arose a situation in which C-era^ny found itself with more
grain than was noodod for normal rapuiromants. In the ordinary course
of events with such a groat ahundanco of grain on hand, there would he
no need to continue tho prohibition of feeding bread gram to livestock
and the law governing this would have boon ropealed. In addition, all

grain ii-®orts would have boon drastically curtailed in view of the ovorabundanoo of the domestic product. This, however, was not the case, the

prohibition of feeding broa.d grain to livestock was not only maintained
but onforood and tho imports of grain, ra.thor than being rnduc.d, w

ectually incroased. mtness Kurt Kosussok in a sworn statomont of

25 February 1948"'' sots tho stock of grain (including corn) in tho h..nds
of tho Hoich Offico for Grain as

rj Exh, 57, Dr-rro Doc, Bk, II B 17
^ Bxh. 1245, HID-14478
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1,558,580 tons

on 30 Juno 1937

2,517,153 tons

on 30 Juno 1938

5,496,739 tons

on 30 Juno 1939

including the imports of tho Roich Offico for tho cpononiiq ycp-j; J938-

1939 o.jnounting to 3,^54,39p tpn^ w^th 1,856,600 tons cpming

ovor-

SOAO.

StorAgo of those tromondous quP-ntitios of donostic nnd ir.iportod

grAln hccrijac tho prinary prohlom for thn Gorman grr.in oconoiny sinco the
existing granaries, including warehouses and elevators, wore far fron
suffi-ciont to meet this task,

Goering, as early as Docombor 1936,

recognized not only tho need of storage space "but tho ir.'portanco of a
storage program to the success of his ro—armamont efforts, sta-ting:
""V^e have to fill warehouses with r.aw mrtorials and food

just a,s tho king of Prussia did in tho Seven Years wan.

Our
^r_3ad must be guarantocd at all costs; it is
more essential than ^uns and shells." 1/

Practically speaking, hov;ovor, the solution demanded tho construction
of sufficient storage space in order that reserves of food could bo
stocl^ilod aga.inst a future demand.

To case this situation cightoon

'(l8) grain elevators (with an avor' go capacity of 5,000 tons each) and
some 330 grain warehouses (with an averrgo cF5>acity of 2,500 tons) v;oro
constructed.

Even this huge building program was far from sufficient

to cover tho need for grain stocl^iling space.

Darro, in a letter to

Gooring, 3 February 1939, pointed out that the Reich ©ffico for Gra.in
had rGquisitionod some 4,700 auxiliary grananics, with a tot^l capacity

of 2,500,000 tons and was procuring additional storage. space for another

1

500,000 tons.

Initially, the Reich Office eocured storage space by simply con

tacting: tho occupent or proprietor and supplying a written requisition
1/ Bxh. 964, in-051, DB 103

.

t, . i, u- . .

2/ Ibid,, See also Exh. 1036, NG—235, letter of Goering to Roich Minister
39 October 1938, Program for Accel^ ratod Construction of" Granarios,

^ Exh. 1037, HG-^43, IB 102
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at a lator datQ.

This program howar^r, assunod such iramonsity that

nearly all of the central and regional offices of the Party, tho Govornraent ^.nd tho Armod Porcos,, requested Darre that he should direct tho
Reich Office to nakc such requisitions only in agreement with those of
fices or at least after haying heard then,

Rarre rejected all of those

requests on tho "basis that otherwise the grain could not have "boon un—.
loaded "and stored which in turn would have repercussions upon rail and

shipping traffic.

In the course of this progran many and varied types

of "buildings were roquisitionod, including garinusiums a.nd other pror.iscs
" which had "been destined to r.ccommoda,t0 the reserve units to "bo xornod on

tho first day of mo"bili2ation.

Thus there arose a conflict 'botwoon the

Armed Forces and tho Ministry of Pood and Agriculture.

The grain storage

'prograjti was jeopardizing the mohilization preparedness of tho Arnod Per—
cos which had to ho avoided and led to tho agrecniont "between the Supremo
Corararnd of the Armed Porcos and tho Ministry.

This agreeraont was ox-

pladnod "by Daprej

. .diving as its reason tho fact that the conpetcnt mili
tary agencies have plnnned tho no"bilization schedule to cover ^

specific premises, and that the mohilization schedule could
not "be altered during tho mo'bilization period (l March 1939—

1 March 1940) , tho SuerGmo Command of the -ii-rmod Porcos has
asked me to instruct tho Reich Office for drain to clear tho
grain a"bove all from the promises required hy the axncd forces
for tho mo"bilization needs and to report tho date of clearance.

Tho Supreme Command of the Arirrd Porcos has emphasized to mo

that rnohilization preparedness must "bo reported hy 1 March
1939 and that speed was theroforo imporativo^ Since, on tho
one hand, tho jeopardizing of the mohilization preparodnoss

for tho Armed Porcos must "bo r.vortod at all costs, and on tho
other hand the Armed Porces thomsolvos have a groat intorost
. in storage of tho nationaJ. grain rosorvos, I hove come to^an

a^roomont with tho Supremo Commander of the Armod Porcos,^to

tho effect that tho decision is to "bo loft to tho Comma.nding
donoral as to what promisGS are a"bsolutoly and inperativoly

nocossary for tho accommodation of tho mo"bilizatidh units and
aro therefore not to he roquisitionod "by the Reich Office for
drain." l/

Koitol, as Chief of Suprorao Command of tho Armnd Porcos, con-

currod in tha opinion of Dnrro thrt tho Artned Torcos did in fr.ct hfivo a

Bpooial interest in grain storrgo. In r lottnr of 3 March 1939 to tho
Ij n3id., m 102, p. 87
- 1^ -

Reich Minister''of Pood rnd Agriculture, among othor Hoich agencies, Keitel on the suhject of grain storage stated:

"The stockpiling of grain is an essential prerequisite for
the conduct of war» The armed forces have a special in

terest in a suitable store." ]J
0. storage Co_st^

. '

In outlining the tremendous- cost entailed in this grain program,
through purchase and storage, the v/itness Kozuszek states that grain

purchases were financed by credits of p- bank group under the lealei^ship
of the Deutsche Rentenbank Kreditanstalt in Berlin, with the credits

being fixed annually by the Reich Minister of Pood and Agriculture and
secured by a guarantee of the Reich Minister of Finance.

As an e^lana^-

tion of the extent of this prograjn, reference is made to the date of 30
June 1938 when the Reich Office haxL utilized out of an approved credit

of 360,000,000 RM, the sum of 339,000,000 RM,

This approved credit was

increased on 50 June 1939 to 950,000,000 RM of which the Reich Office
for Grain utilized 904,000,000 RM.

Por.the/period up to 30 June 1937, the Reich Office for Grain
not only had to cover the cost of the grain purchases, but also the ex
penses for storing the grain, the administrative -vnd credit expenses.

Afterwards, on the orders of the Reich Ministry of Pood and Agriculture,
the stockpiling of grain took on such proportions that the storage and

other expenses could not be borne any longer by the Reich Office for

Grain v/hich w-as run on a. business b^'asis.

For this reason, by tho regu

lation of the Reich Ministrv of Pood and Agriculture of 19 August 1938,
- i- ;

the Reich took over these expenses.

The budget account of the Reich Ministrv of Pood and Agriculture
for the fisca3. year 1938 contains the follovj-ing substantiation!

"Oince the beginning of the gmin economy year 1938/1939, the
Reich Office for Grain, Peedstuffs and Other Agricultural
Products is being reimbursed regularly for the storage ex

penses caused by the storage of grain i.e. the charges on

1/ Bxh. 1038, NG-2464, SB 102, p. 88
16 ^

'

•

•

"the merchPindise, the Mministrative ejg^enses, the cost
of credit, etc. The incroasecl holdings of reserves, as

ordered "by the Reich G-overninent, required additionpl funds

for which the "budgetary funds did not suffice."

♦

Funds listed in the "budget amounted to fi-9*,243,982.05 RM, with

odditionp-1 expense dealt with iq the fiSGf!-! year 1939, qf 16,329,823,41
RM moMnf a total expense for measures in tho field of the grain economy
iJ
of 85,573,806.26 RM.

In the "budget accoimt of tho Reich Ministry of Food and ^ricul3/
ture for the fiscal year 1939,- there was listed for measures in tho field

of the grain and legume econony the amount of 432,000,000 Ri^i.

But this

amount did not suffice and wa^ exceeded "by 143,899,320.08

the total expense amounted to 559,569,496.67 Elvl.
^

so that,

The additionpl expense

is su'ostantiated as follows:

"By order of tho State Leadership, the Reich affice for G-rrin
had to increase considerably its grrin reserves.

Moreover,

the spme moasures as in the provious year to reduce the price
of bread h^d also to be carried out in tho gr^^in econony ye^r

1939/40. Since funds were not provided for in the budget,
the romount hod. to be booked under extraordin'^ry expenses." ^
The increased purcho.se of domestic ^nd foreign groin nocessit -ted

the carrying out of a construction program for addition-1 storage space.
Alrcadv the budget a.ccount of the Reich Ministry of Food end
i/

Agriculture for the fiecol yo.-r 1935 cont.-'ins the fpllowing rem.-.rk on
.tl .

the expense item: "Measures in tho field of tho grain economy
"From tho funds, subsidies for the construction of

granaries are a.xso to "bo granted, jj

The budget recount of the Raich Ministry of Food rnd Agriculture
for the fisc.rl yerx 1939 provides for rn extrrordinrry expense for the
construction of grr-in elovr.tors rnd wP.rehouse sheds r.nd suhstrnti"tes
this expense as follows:

1/ Sxh. 3880, 1513-15555, p. 1105 of originrl, IE 161-A

^

Ibid., p. 488 of original

^ Exh. 3881, NIId-15554, LB 161-A
^

Ibid,, p. 68 of original
Ibid., p. 1431 of original

6/ Exh. 3878, i;TIL-15557, LB 161-A
7/ Ibid., p. 387 of original

-

17 -

"In considorPtion of tho incrnnsod holding of grrin ro-

sorvos, thn construction of new gro.no.ries on a largor
scrlo WAS nocossnry. As privotn onterpriso was not
fully nhle to ^do so - not ever with tho grA,nting of
Hoich suhsidios - Eoich owned gr-'^in olovo-tors nnd warohouso-sheds had to lo constructed.
Since funds wore not

provided for in tho "budget, the amount hnd. to he "booked

undor extraordinary oxponsos," Zj
Tho budget account of tho Reich Ministry of Food and ilgriculturo
for tho fiscal year 1939 contains tho following onco-occurring expenses
for tho construction of granarios, namely

1.

Construction of Reich ov/nod grain elovators and grain vaarohousos
in tho amount of 43,661,006.20

2.

Reich su'baidios for tho construction and eq.uipping of privately
owned grain warehouses including intorost-roducing suhsilios in

the ajnount of 12,292,333.40 RM. ^
This tromondous grain stockpiling program was a horary drain on
the finances of the Roich..

In his letter of 31 March. 1939 to Rarro, the Reich Minister of

Finance Sch\-/erin-Krosigk took issue with tho huge expenditures involved, stating that,

"Tho costs of the execution of the grain st'cckpiling pro-

gran are gradually hecoining so high that my responsibility

for the development of the Financos of the Reich make^ it

my duty to oppose any further increase of the quantities
to bo stored beyond tho limits set in this ^letter. ^

cording to your comput?"tions, which I consider in itseTf

as correct, the joint credit of the banks must now

in-

creased from 750 million EM to 950 million SM though the

hanks state that they are no longer in a positron

additional funds.

The costs to he provided

budget for the stockpiling of grain inclusive of tho con
struction of grain elevators and grain warehouse-sheds
relrirreach
the amount of half of hiipon EM. Tp gve

you an idea of the else of the amount I may point out

that thereby nearly a third of tho entire

the Sorman Heich for Army

^

f °/2h^mag4tudo

boon reached. Tho costs are the result of tho
Of the stockpiling program and of the

GoneralFieldMarshnl Goorlng accordi^ to y

that- a war grain reserve of at least 6 million tons is

bo stored permanently."
Zj Ibid., p. 1105 of original
^ Ibid., p. 666 of original
^ Exh. 1173, NG-4345, RB 70-C
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This is the war grain reserve referred to "by the affiant Dasslor,

"In August 1939, it was perfectly clear to me that the
whole grain stockpiling econony from 1936 to 1939 woe
designed for r war."

Daaslor made this statement to refute the allegations of the iDofendant^
"boforo the IMT who were contending that a^grossiTo wax was not plr,nnod.

^tat^m_qni _pf_I)ar_roJ_s__Itefon^o_on Grain ^tp_rago
Darro sta-tos tha.t his docision to stockpile grain and other

foodstuffs was "based upon his ezporionccs during 1937 when, "because

of inaAociUatG broad grain rosorves (duo to a poor harvest) an emergency
situation arose which was embarrassing to the Ministry and almost led

to the introduction of a broad rationing program throughout Germany.
It wa-s at this time tha.t the regulation prohibiting the feeding of

"bronl grain to livestock wp.s issued. 2arro states that ho wa^ dotcrrainod to prevent the ropotition of such a situ"tion and the reflections
which it had cast upon the Food Ministry,

It was follov^ing tnis deci

sion ba^od upon the poor harvest of 1937, that Europe and the world wore
sy

faced vjith the burpor crop of 1938, and the introduction of a pr-actico

of o^ort dumping on the part of the United States and other overseas
4/

countries.

In an effort to relievo this situation of a flooded grain mar-

tot, Gcrm,-^.ns^ m«io

gr-in purohrsos tb't it ordinarily would not

hato. With thooo additional puroha.sos rud the 4,000,000 ton incrcaso
in tho 1938 harrost oano a. rovoroaj. of th) prerioue situation auid now
Darro wa^ fa.ood with tho prohlom of haying sufficient storP.eo spuco for
the available surplus.

Uarrc, admitting that in spite of all this surplus grain on

hand aormany continued to ourohaso grain from the ovorsoa^ and southo.ast-rn countries, axLds that this was quite necessary on tho ha.sls of
1/ Esh. C-398, 4034-PS, 3B 162

^
^
^

Tr. 18829
Tr. 18831
Tr. 18832
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conracrcinl trof^-tios thon in offoct.

In sotting forth tho rop^on for

tho purchases of certain quantities of grain on tho opon market during
1939, Darro insists that thoy \^QrG nocossary in ordor to moot tho de
mands of the tJnitod States and Canada on tho one hand, a.nd Hungary and
Rouraa.nia. on tho othor, since those countries insisted that their sur

plus grain he taken over and that it was to Germain's honofit to con—
tinue a friendly husinoss relationship with tho ojiport countries.

De

livery of this and other grain th-^t had "boon contracted for had a

•bea,ring upon tho need for additional warehouse spa.co within the Heidi.
This storage program was not a gu®-rdod secret hut rather was a, matter
to he hrou^t to tho attention of the poasantrjr, which was done hy

Darro during his Peasant Dcy Speech of 1938, when ho pointed out the
need of refrigerator v/arohousos and regular warehouses for tho stock-

piling program that was forced upon him hy the record harvest of 1938.
In o:^laining his friluro to rescind the prohihition against feeding
9

hroad grain to livestock, Darro stated that r poal of this regulation
Would have hoon inconsistent with his agricultural policy since it would

havG disturhod tho rhythm of tho Gorman agricultural economy, which was
opposed to any zigzag courso.

Concerning his order of 11 Sfehruary 1939, and any hearing it

had upon tho grain storage program, Darro stated that he acted pursuant
to a Gooring order which in itsolf was tracoahlo to a speech of United'
•V

States Sonator Pittman, causing Gooring to take'an interest in the grain

roscrvo and requiring a survey of the Gorman grain oconoiiy in conjunction

with the "A" Case.

According to Darro, it was also Gooring's decision

to stocl^ilo 6,000,000 tons of grain as a war reserve.

Darro aMs that

ho was not in accord with Gocring on this-point and had actually oh-

jccted to Gooring's policy in his report of 21 Jajiuary 1939.

Ij
^
gf
4/
57

Tr.
Tr.
Tr.
Tr.
Tr.

18840
18844
18836
21093
21115

•••ii
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io_thoJDcfon^o__on &r^in St^rr;.^
Earro contonds that the grain storago program was not a war pre

paration noasuro "but was moroly a result of the hunger crop of 1958,

Since this harvest produced the 5.5 million tons of grain accximulatod
Igt tho iteich Office for Grain in Juno 1939, the onl^ question that
Earro considers is whether or not the stor^-go of an additional half mil

lion or one million tons,, which was "being provided for, wan part of a

plan to wage aggrossivo war,

To explain tho status of the grain storage

program during tho summer of 1939, the defense offered the affida.vit of
^rt Zschirnt stating that:

distinction is to ho mp.do hctwoon tho transition stock

and a.n equalization stock. The transition stock should
amount to approxlmatGly 1.5 million tons of "hroal grain.
The equalize,tion stock which is equalizing th® difforonco
hotwoon good and "bad stocks, and dotermlnod "by the sur

pluses o"btaina"blo from good harvoste. Tho Gorman total
grain ha.rvost varied "betwoon 21 and 35 million tons por

year.

In other words, thoro was a difforonco of up to 4

million tons.

No wondor thoroforo that if a very "bad har-

vost is followed hy a very good one tho public rosorvos
incroaso greatly." 1/

If this sta-toraont is presented to oxplaln tho oxistenco of 5-5 million
tons of rcsorvo grain in the hands of tho Reich Office for Gram, it

is acceptablG hut if it is offorod to Justify the ontiro war grain rosprvo, then It omits a vory inportant factor, namely tho amount of grain

hold hy othor^pntorprisos upon tho dlroctlon of tho Roich Office, Tho
witness Kozuszok in his sworn stntomont explained that point correctly:

"The warohouso resorvos of tho Roich Cffic© for Grain

quoted ahove do not contain those quantities which woro

in tho hands of the doaiors. flour mills and other pro
cessing onteiprisos in tho form of grain flour, otc. It
must ho assumed that thoso stocks too with these ontor-

prises were particulaxly largo in the years 1938-1939 and

1939-1940 ras tho Roich Office hocause of tho shortage of

suitahlo warehousing facilities, accruing warehouse cost
and tho gonorai risks, had ondoavorod to transfer oxcossivo quantities of grain to tho doaiors and processing
ontorprisos," ^

Ry confuting tho amount of gram avaliablo for consumption within tho
ly Darro Ssh- TO, EB II B 37c
2j Exh. 1245, NIE-14478
-
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Hsich "both in tho he.nds of tho Roich Offico for (Jrain and in tho hmds of

tjio donlcrs rnd processing ontoiprises tho sum totnl vas 8.6 million tons,

la/

5^is figiu-o prosontod tho Gorman grain rosorvo in its most favora'blo light

and as such was usod as a propaganda moaeuro to conrinco tho Gorman pooplo
that GUfficiont foodstuffs woro on hand to gnarantoo tho fooding of tho

u
nation.

In accounting for'tho fact th'^t ovor 3 million tons of grain

were inportod at a time whon hugo storos of domestic grain wore arailahlo,
4

Darro sta,tod that it was sinply a mattor of continuing to do "business with,

tho gr<aih osport countrios who in other ypars h^d supplied Gormany^s grain
noods.

There was ®l.so the nddod factor that much of tho grain had already

"boon contractod for and could not ho cancollod,

Ho attonpt is made to

oxplain why tho Roich'Offlco for Grain, facod with tho situation of
"huirtpor crop -for tho coming ha^rrcst (l938) raado additional contracts for

grain purchasos and after the harvost continund to ''"uy vast a^mountb of
grain r.athcr than curtail the purchasing program v^hon moro than sufficiont.
stocks woro adrcady 'on hand.

Tho officials concernod with tho immcdia.to

grain storage prograjn, whilo alloging that thoy wore not informed of
aggrossivp war plans in conjunction with the accumulation of a grain ro—

'"Borvo, allow that their superiors might have had othor information.

Ac--

cording to tho statomont of Dr. Vf^lthor,

"During discussions in trade policy, insofar as I attondod
thorn up to 1939, it was nevor said that gr'-in rosorvos had
to "be accumulated in preparation for aggrossj.vo war. It is
of course feaslMo that such decisions worn montionnd in

higher quarters," ^

Of tho same opinion is -the affiant Duoring, whon ho states
"Nono of tho moa.suros ordorod or inrolomonted to incroaso

tho grain rosorvo or its storago facilities, wore c^nsidorod to ho planned preparations for aggrossivo warfaro
either "by myself or, an far as I can ma.k:o ^nt,
iry"
colloaguos.

The- idea prevailing In this rospnct amon.-

Ministers and Stat "i Socrctarloe, of course was unknown to

wf.

mo." i/

.

1/ Exh, 1039, HG-383, DB 103, p. 94

'

2/ Darro 3xh. 74, DB II B 31.

^ Darrc Bxh. 69, KB II B S7b
]SJ Tostimpny of J^itnoss Zschirnt, CommisBlonor Stognor, 29 Get 1948,

relating to total of 8.6 million tons Is in accord with this figure

as being tho apprC^imato nmcfunt of grain availablo during august 1939,
-
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In ordor to justify the continued P-ccunulotion of a grain ro—
servo p-nd tho added measures that wore conducted during the spring and

summer of 1939 in. the German grain economy., 'Darre points to the statement
of United- States Senator Pittma-n, made in conjunction with President

Roosevelt's ITew Year's message for 1939 as the underlying cause for

Goering's great concern for Germs,ny's food supply.

Goering ordered the

Pood Ministry and its agencies to make every effort to guarantee the
feeding of the German people in the event that this 'became necessary

through the acts of foreign powers.

As evidence of Pittman's statement

the Defense produced an excaipt from an editorial published in the

Voelkiischer Beobachter on 6 January 1939 v/hich consisted of the follov;ing statement?

. .It has just been reported from Washington that
Senator Pittman, referring to the President's New Year
message, has just propheciod that Congress v^iil approve

'moral, economic and financial sanctions against the
dictatorships.
that did not necessarily moan war for

ij
"I'/hy shoot a man if he can be starved to death."
^he significance of the statom'^nt is pointed up in the description given
the excerpt by the defense, "Senator Pittman invents the slogan 'hunger
blockade.'"

D^-rre testified that this v-ras sufficient cause for Goering

to become alarmed although he himself is not sure whether he ever read
this article in newsprint.

Darre did testify that all the measures taken

by him at this time and particularly those measures relating to the ""A"
Case are traceable to Pittman's oomraent on Roosevelt's New Year's message,
To afford the Tribunal a comparison of how the Pittman statement
was received and commented upon by the German press, the Prosecution in-

troduced tho report of the "Prankfurtor Zeitung" of 4 Januaiy 1939,

iJ

which since it has been in the library for the past two years was
available to tho defense.

This article in referring: to the statement of

1/ Darre Exh. 71, DB II B 28.
2/ Exh. 0-393, NID-15658
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Senator Pittnan reports:
"In

opinion,. President Poosevelt 'belioV'Ofi that we have

the economic and financial power to,enforce definite rights
without employing physical force,

I agree with this and

also holiovc that the statesmen of the whole world arc clear

ahout our potential pov;or."

The variance •botvreon the article as puhlishod in the Voolkischer Beohachtor and the frankfurter Zeitung is quite obvious

li

_

as is tho attcji^t

on tho part of the defense to find some justification for tho enormous
grain rosorvo accumulated during 1938-1939,

In reply to the question of why the 1938 bumper crop did npt

coKpcl the Hoich food Ministry to repeal the prohibition of feeding bread
grain to livostock, tho defense again rofor to the affiant Zschirnt who
statos

that:

"V/hon in 1937, the grain harvest was extremely poor,' tho
omorgoncy situation could only bo handled by prohibiting
farmers to food broad grain to animals. This prohibition

forcod many farmers to a complete change, farmers vrho had
gone in for hog raising on a largo 'scale and fed these hogs
with rye, had to reduce their hog stocks and mako tho neces
sary adjustments. In 1938, tho question was seriously dis
cussed v/hothor, in view of the good harvest, the prohibition
should not bo rescinded. However, after lon£;' deliberations,
it W£^ decided to maintain tho prohibition. Agriculturo

v;hich, in tho preceding years, had adjusted itself \d.th
groat sacrifices, would not have boon cor-pelled to rovort
to its original methods. If tho prohibition of feeding

•i.' '• b

broad grain to animals had been introduced in lator years,

thoy could have protested against this zigzag course.^
If the broad grain reserve had not boon a war rosorvo then there vrould

have boon enough grain available to meet G-erman demands even if tho
poor harvest of 1937 was repeated.

•h

But there was another and more im

portant factor to be considered here, tho political situation during ,
1938.

At tho time whon the decision not to repeal tho prohibition

against feeding broad grain to livostock was made, Austria and Czecho

slovakia had been accomplished and tho Polish question held the world's

i.
r'l I

2j To con^aro tho relative value of these newspapers in tho mind of
the German readora we ini^t suggest as a typical example a com—

paxison betvreen tho Now York Times and New York Daily News with

tho frankfurter Zoitung on tho same plane as tho Now York Times,
2/

Darro fxh. 70. BB II B 37c

—

^ i4i'tv i

•-»
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attention.

As tho situation dovalopod, had the prohitJition "boon repealed

during late 1938 or early 1939, it would have hcon re—introduced at tho
outbreak of the war.

This was tho zigzag course that was to ho avoidod

and was tho reason for the failuTvo to remove the "ban.

As additional proof of Darre's participation in the grain
storage program, reference was made to the letters of Reich Minister von

Kroslgk addressed to Darre during the summer of 1939, disclosing Darrc's
attenpt to obtain credits totalling 900,000,000 RM, which von Krosigk
was not only onnosed to "but went on record as oljocting to tho oxton—

y
sion of credit roquosted.

. .
^
5'rom this series of letters it i« cIopx that

an extension of credit amounting to 650,000,000 RM had "been agreed upon
"by tho Ministry of Pood and Agriculture ajid tho Minister of Pinanco "bu.t
tho lO-ttor v;a.s now stating his ohjection to a.n increase in this amount

sinco tho entire program no longer represented a sound economic propo2/
sition.

Darre testified that ho also ohjoctGd to tho Gooring program
and for similar reasons.

In referring to Darre's objections to Gooring's overall program

as set forth in his report of 31 January 1939, we failed to find any
roforcncc to a grain storage program although the program was thon in
operation and had boon begun prior to that time.

This report (21 January 1939) is an effort by Darra to increase
the production of all foodstuffs on an incentive "basis and by gaining
additiona-l rcmunoration

for the peasants to warrant a successful cam

paign in ordor to achieve his goal.

It was after Darro conplotnd his

report of 2l January 1939 .that tho questions of grain storage costs and

credits for grain purchases arose.

At this time Darre is entirely in

accord with Gooring insofar as bbtaining additional credits for gra.in

U Sxh. 1173, HG-4345, DB 70-C

^

Testimony of the witness Viktor von Knorro for Commissioner Craw
ford, 36 August 1948 (Tr, 18331 R) disclosed that tho amount actually
stockpiled was 6,4 million tons.

In tho words of the witness, "wo

never had so much before."

37 Tr. 21118
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purchP.sca oxo concGmcd.

In this inp.ttor wc hP-vc no oTDjoction from

DG-rrc, who in tho summor of 1939 continues to domand an increase in the

amount of credits granted to tho Gorman grain oconomy so that he can

1/.

build an oven greater v;ar grain rosonro.

Order £f_5'pbr;uar2^ 1?39
On 11 Pobmary 1939, loss than one month

ofore the occupation

of Czechoslovakia, .Derre issued an ordor to the following agencies sub—
•' -'lU

; HI

ordina-te to him*

1.

The Reich Office for Grain, Roedstuffs and Other

Agriculture''l Products,
2.

The Central Cra-in and Foodstuffs Marketing Association,

3.

Tho Office for Food Security,

4.

Tho Food Sconoiry Research Office,

requiring from them immediately a renort of their viovrs on tho follov;ing
questions:

1,

Present state of tho grain and fodder supply,

2»

Probable state of the grain supply at tho ond of tho

economic year 1936/1939,
3.

Present state and future dcvolopmont of the storage
of grain,

4.

Mcn.suros to prevent th^ spoiling of grain stochs etc.

5,

Chang is to bo expected in the grcain pnd fodder si:ipply
situation in the event of mobilization,

6.

(Roconstructod) Drcp in grain and foddor production
to bo expcctod during a war and its effect on the

grain resorvo. ^

The reports of those four agencies

3/

wore ccwidensed and conmontod
4/

upon in a report of the Division II of tho Ministry

and submitted to

'-li

1/ Esh. 1173, lirG-3:345, DB 70-C
2l1
^uestior^ 1 to 5 are found in tho roports of these agencies.
^ 1. Report of the Reich Office for Grain, Foedstuffs and Other Agri
cultural Products of 14 Fobrupry 1939 (Bxh. 0-394, 1TID-15303,DB
162).
2. Report of tho Central Grain and Foodstuffs Marketing Association

of 14 February 1939 (Bxh. C-395. inD-15304, DB 162).

3. Report of the Office of Food Security of 14 Fobrua-Ty 1939 (Bxh.
C-396, KID-15305, DB 162).

4. Reoort of Food Bconon^ Research Office (no date) (Exh. 0-397,
lTID-15306).

4/ Bxh. 3550, NID-14941, DB 107 find 162-A.
-.•26
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Darro a covor lottot of the Division Chief Moritz, dated 17 Fohruary

1/
1939. The report estimates the stock of "bread-grain on 31 Decerahor 1937
with 12,011,000 tons - 4,940,000 tons moro than a year hofora - (v^cstion
l) and on 31 July 1939 with 6,240,000 tons or 5,600,000 tons respectively

(i^icstion 2), stresses the in^ortanco of securing additional warehouse
space for the stoclqjiling of grain (tjiestion 3), taices issue with the
feeding of "broad-grain to livestock (^.^ostion 4), further the docrease
in production and its effects on the grain and la"bor situation under the
follov/ing conditions;

1. Svont of no"bilization 1 April 1939,

,

2. The surplus territory of ISast frussia and the production
of the Limes zone of the Western Hoich territory a-re not
availa"blo.
3. Inports of foodstuffs and foodstuffs "^.'y soa and land anc

"blocked (^.^Gstions 5 and 6).
Moritz, in his cover lott'^r, dra.ws special attention to the

answering of questions 5 and 6.

According to Moritz,

"It is "ba^cd on a

political and military situar-

tion and takes into consideration all the oxporioncos gained

in the war of 1914/18 up to the present dato.

Only, circum

stances in and disturbing factors of the v/ar aro considorod
v/hich can "bo weighed up and according to the experionco and

knowledge of experts accounted for with some degree of cer
tainty.
*

It is solf-ovident that the offices v;hich here

express their viewpoints realize without exception tha.t the
dcgroo of possi"blo jeopardizing this output ce^acity exists
in a subjoctivo as well as an objective sense. In a war of
the futuro, situations will bo possible which can make any

preparation, howovor carefully worked out, either coiiplotoly
or nearly ineffective."

There' is only one satisfactoiy answer to the question of v/hy those con
ditions wore assumed as the given military-political situation.

Darro

know that the seizure of Czachoslovaicia was planned by Hitler in the im-

modiato futuro and it might load to war with Poland, Prance and England.
The loss of East Prussia and tho Limes zone had to bo taken into considoration as well as a blockade by the British and French navies.

Thorofpro, tho 73 hours deadline for tho preparation of all reports.

Sxh. 2549, m::M-l4940, DB 107, p. 1

- 2? -

Darro hpd rcsad thn roport of Division II as woll ag tho cover
lottor of Koritz very carefully as ho has raado a. number of marginal
notes, such as "corroct, vory good, dccisivo, that is tho gist of tho

matter."

OIig statement at the end of tho report, to onploy a sufficient

number of prisoners of war in agriculture provoked Darro to P4d a foot

note stating his opposition to tho oraploymont of Russian prisoners of v/ar
in agriculture, because thoy v/ould bocomo seditious units for tho Soviot
Russia propaganda.

In addition, he had written under the da.to of 30 February 1939
II
a priva,t0 note to Moritz.
There ho sta-tos that tho weak point of our
r

food supply is tho fat gap.

Ho workod together'with Oooring in tho

attempt to ovarcomo the omorgoncy caused by tho lack of fats within tho
Reich.

Rarro, in answer to G-onring's question as to tho absolute mini

mum needed a.s a national rosorvc in ordor to bo propaxod for the "A"

CasG, sta.tcd that the ontiro question depended upon the extent to
which foodstuffs could bo reloaded for, tho fattening of pigs which in

turn was linked up with tho question of grain storago.

In other words,

the dosing of the fat gap dopendod upon a succossful grain storage
program,

^hp; Offico__fpr_Fpod Security

Another Raxro agency contributing to the preparation for war,
i} «

was the Office for Food Security and its branch offices.

Its origin

and its activitios are discussed in tv/o affidavits, the first by Rr.
2/
^

Eurt Dietrich

and the socond by Dr. Bornhard Schwarz.

At the suggestion of Major Eriogshoim, who also particlpa-tod in

tho conforonco at which Darro decided to incorporate tho Roica Food Sstato into tho Minis,trj' in the ovent of mobilization, —

Office for

Security was set up a,t tho Staff Office of tho Reich peasant Doador In
y Sxh. 3551, HID-14942, DB 107
2/ Sxh. C-410, KID-15675, DB 162-A
Zj Sxh. C-399, 1;T0- 1634,

DB 162

47 Of pages ^ 33 and 8
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Berlin with "branch officee at the office of each Regional Peasant Loader

during 1S37/38,

Theso Offices for Pood Security "being part of the Reich

Pood Bsta.to v/orc not Bu"bordinato to State Secretary Backo and he thoro-

foro had no authori^ to issue directives to them.

^

Por security reasons, each office had a very small staff whoso

momhors v^oro sv7orn to secrecy.

The Office for Pood Secucity in Koonigs-

. "berg (Past-Prussia) and pro"ba"bly all others raccived a stool safe.
A doso cooperation os:istod hotwoon the Reich Ministry of Pood
and igriculturo and the Reich Pood Estato, rGspoctively, and the Supromo

Conimnnds of the Army and Navy in all matters concerning the food supply
of soldiers and sailors.

Detailed negotiations wore conducted "botwocn

the Office for Pood Security in Berlin and the Suprorae Command of the

Arniod Porcos on such questions as the stocking of the reserve food
depots, tho fixing of quotas to the individual County Peasant Associa
tions for tho delivery of potatoes, oats, hay and stra.w.
A number of work meetings in which all heads of tho Officos for

Pood Security participated wore hold in 1936 and 1939,

i/

The a.gondP' of the work mocting from 27 to 30 .^ril 1938

contains

reports on experience with task mobilization of two arny corps, revision
Y

of the procurement principles for supplying tho reserve depots, investi

gation of the supply situation of big cities or industrial areas.
agonda of the work meeting from 22 to 27 August 1938

Tho

refers to such

topics as mobilization calendar and mobilization directives, safeguard

ing of war production enterprises.

Tho agenda of tho work meeting from

•§/
^ to 6 ^ril 1935 refers among other topics to tho orga.nization of the
war food oconoJiy and again raobilizP-tion calendar and mobilization direc
tives, supplying of the Armed Porcos, transportation questions such

concerning tho supply of grain and flour, potatoes, cattlo and raoat,

milk and fat, public control and distribution plans, inventory of stocks
31 March 1939.

1/ Exh. C-411, NID-15314, IB 163-A
gj Exh. C-400, NID-15315, DB 162
Sy B::h. C-401, NlD-15316, IB 162

Tho scopo of the f-ctivitios of tho Offices for Jood Security is
rovo^'-lod in the extensive report of tho Office for Pood Security v;ith tho
Reich Peasant Loader, d?-ted 14 Petruary 1939, which v/as made in coirtDli-

1?

ance with tho earlier mentioned order of Parre of 11 Pehruary 1939.

Tho report which takes issuo to Se.rro's questions iTos. 5 a.nd 6,
discusses in detail mainly tho decrease in domestic production due. to
tho withdrawal of farm managers and workers, draught animals and trac

tors and to the lack of working materipls in the event of mohilizP.tion,

In-order to counteract tho withdrawal of farm managers and workers, there
wore deferred from military service,
<
t

45,354 or 3.6 ^ of the farm owners and managers
63,154 or 2,2 ^ of the skillod v/orkers.
It v;as a tremendous amount of painstaking work for tho Offices
for Pood Security to index the names and other d^^ta. of f'hout 1,5 million

farm managers and owners, and of ahout 1.3 million skilled vrorkcrs such

as milkers, tractor drivers, mechanics and cra.ftsmon> to select from
them those individuals who wore considered indisponsahle for tho mainten

ance of agricultural production and to sot their deferment from millta.ry
service in motion.

This fact also demonstrates the thoroughness and ef

ficiency of tho war propa-rations as conducted in the' field of tho food
oconony.

There is ovidonco arailahle of another action of the Office for

Pood Security in Berlin, referring to tho withdrawal of mohilization'or-

dors for Peasant Loaders. In a letter of 19 Soptem'bor 1938, it requested

that all Rogioisil and County Peasant Loaders who are to "bo appointed
Heads of the Regional Pood Offices and Pood Offices in the event of mo

bilization, are to bo reloaBod by tho Pa^ty. With letter of 5 May
1939, this request was ropoa.tnd.

1/ Bxh. C-396. MI)-15305, PB 162
^ Bxh. C-402, HID-15317, IB 162
3/ Exh. C-403, UlP-lSSie. PB 162
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II,

Sconoinic_Mobil^2ati.on
PfftP^-rations

' For the uniforsn plf^Jining, coordinrtion

adjustment of all fun-

dajnontal proparations for the war economy, the Plenipotentiary Gonoral
for the Vfar Fconony ostahlishod prior to Docomhor 1937 a. Directing

Staff coirposod of spocia.lists of five Reich Ministries and Reich authoritios Euhordinato to him in war—tlmo and hound hy his directives in poaco-

timo, among thoin the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Asecret

report entitled: "The Preparation of the Fconomic Mohiliza.tion hy the
Plenipotentiary General for '^J'ar Economy) Status as of
end of Deccmhor 1937", outlined- the plans ndvancod as to this date,

Eor the pur-

pOBo of carrying out tho specific tasks rolatiiig to the wan economy, the
Soicli Ministry of Food and Agriculture ha.d assigned mohiliza.tion tasks
to:

1.

The Food Economy Rosoarcli Office for drawing up war
food plf-ms

2. Tho Reich Offices
3.

)

^

) for tho proparation of tho war

Tho Hnich Food Estate)

food oconoray

In ordor to crrry out tho wnr food oconoiny plon, tho Hoich Mln-

istor of Food ond Agrioulturo h."d drnftod nn ov.oroll deoroo on tho

orgnnizntion of tho won food oconony r,nd further dooroos on tho pu-bllo
control of r-grlculturnl products in genornl and in particular. In the
ovont of mohillzation, tho Hoich Hood Bstato was to to placed under tho

Ministry, tho Hogional Poa.sant Association and County Poasrnts Associfw
tions woro^ to incorporated into tho Hogionnl Hood Offices and Hood
Offices to Do set up on tho intormodiato and lowor --dministra.tive lovols.
In addition, the report diacuisos tho proDloras of stockpiling, ovacup^
tion and salvaging, rationing systom for th.e civilian population,
ly Exh. 1031, EO-258, DE 103, p, 32
-
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supplying of the Armod Forcos and also cajrd indicos for agriculturo and
tho food industry.

B.

Finrl Proparatlons

In loss than n year's time, tho drafting of the legislation to "bo

proirrulgatcd in tho ovont of mohilization, v/as conplvTtGd. A secret printed
"booklot entitled: "Bocroes to Introduce tho War Pood Bcononiy" consisting
of soTontoon (l?) docroGs, was issued "by tho Reich Minister of Pood end

Agriculture in Septomher 1938.

A coraporison hetvrtJon the titles of tho

secret draft of 1938 with the titles of tho docrons promulgatod in lato
1/

August and early Septomhor 1938 discloses them elmost identical. This
hooklot was attached to a Joint Circular Order of tho Reich Minister of
/

Pood and Agriculture and the Reich Minister of tho Interior of 8 Soptom—
"bor 1938. si^enod "bv Barro cand Prick.

Prom this order, in v;hich detailed

commonts a,nd oxplanations to the drafted docroos are given, tho follow
ing is c^uoted:

"Tho Reich Ministry of Pood and Agriculture has novj finished
•*

its draft of the scries of decroos v;hich contaiin the nocos—

i

sa,ry provisions for tho introduction of a war* food ocononiy

^

raohilization. . . . Sl'ow the standpoint of organization,

in case of war and are to ho put in force with the order for

.
•

this scries of docrees provides for tho direct suhordination
of tho.Roich Pood Sstato to tho Reich Ministry of Pood and

Agriculturo, and the incorporation of the Regional and County
Offices and other suh-divisions of tho Hoich Pood Pstato in

the respective cor-petont authorities of tho Interior a^iniinistration. Thus a uniform closely knit organization of
authorities from tho highest to the lov;ost level is provided,
which mahos-it possihln to control and direct tho food sup-

"

,

ply of the armed forces, and civilian population according

to the prevailing production and foodstock situntion."

"_Sincp the ^ohror _^d Reich Chancellor_haa_ordored_tho_p^E.arali_pn__end_ec_onomi_c iBohili_za_tlpn_tp_ hG_Rpop_do_d_up,_onc_of
the ra03t_urgent. tasks of_tho_loading_officials_in ^arge_of
csiahl_lshmpnt. ^f„tho_war_f_ood pffices willjtp lo_cpr:innncp

i_mmodiatply,_lf t,hpy_havp nojt Rlready dono_sp,_the_preliinina^
vork_accprding_tp Ihn mohili2.alipn_calGndar ,_a^d_tp in_suro_i_t3
sppody_cp,niplpti_on i>j/_the_ter'porary_assjLgimpn_t pf„assj.gtanl
vTorkors. The doadiino_i_s Ihe 151h_of• Ocloher I938j_"_*i

1/ Ml, 103^, BG-465, BB 102, p.. 64, Part 3

2y Exh, 1032, RG-465, BB 102, p. 64, Pp,rt 1
Underlining added
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It Is no colncidenco that this doadlino of 15 Octohor 1938 was

set.

Tho above order was issued prior to the Czech crisis which with

out the Munich ngreement would hnvo stprted the war alrerdy in f-all
1938.

Confirmation of the prepar-ation of this war food plan in its

ovory detail is found in tho sworn statement o,f Kurt Dietrich, doscrihing his activities as Reich Dofonsc Official in tho Reich Ministry of
ly

Food and Agriculture.

This statoment adso contains the or^lanation of

the relative position of tho Reich Ministrj^ of I^ood and Agriculture and
tho Reich Pood Bstato at the outhroa-k of the waTj and Darrens decision

to placo at tho disposal of the Pood Ministiy a network of agoncios
loaching to all levels as the orga.nizational set-up of tho war food ^
Gconoiny.

"An additionrl question of organisation to he solved wan
how the Roich Pood Satato should be utilized in tho ovent
of war as tho Reich Ministry of Pood hal no branch organ

ization whatsoever in tho provinces and counties.

I ro-

mombor a discussion with Minister Da-rro on tho orgajiization
of tho administration of oconomy in the event of war. At
this conforonco. which I think took place in 1937 botwoon
Minister Darre, State Socrotary Banke. the Roich Commissar

4.

for special assignment Kriogshoim and mo, Daerro's decision

was such that tho Central Main Divisions II -nd HI
task it was to deal with tho production, processing and uis-

tribution of agricultural products, likewise all Central
Marketing Associations wore subordinated to tho Ministry
Pood.

In addition it was decided to incorporate tno Ro

gional Peasant Associations as Region-*^! Pood Offices Divi

sion A into tho gnnoral regional Administration.

"In this wry tho Pood Ministry haft at its disposal at the
beginning of the war a network of agencies orgmizod from
tho highest down to the lowest levels, with whose help a

planned system of food control and rationing was possible.
C»

1.2C£Cut ion

livo dnys TJOfore the Imrasion of Polmd, the entiro Sormwi eoono-

rajr was put on P- war footing hy a numhcr of dooreos promlgatod in tho
Eolchsgosotshlatt. Tho 'Tlrst Socroo to Carry out tho Deoroe on tho
preliminary Safogur^ding of tho Vital Eciuiremonts of Gorioan People" ,
1/ Pxh. 1034, mD-13721, DB 103, p. 68
2/

Ibid., p. 69

^ 33 -

''1
...

u
dated 27 iiigust 1939

and signed "by EOrro, est'-.'blishod food rationing

for the suhsoquont first four weeks with a uniform ration card for all
rationed foodstuffs.

OJhosG ration cards had heen printed and diatri-

"butod down to the levels of couatios and cities.

A second docroo undor

tho samo date of 27 August, the "Lecrae on the Public Control of Agri2/

cultural Products"

also signed by Darro, contains ell basic provisions

for tho introduction of a permanent v;ar food economy, among them tho
tasks of the officos in charge of public control, namely the Hogional

Pood Offices, the Pood Officos, tho Central Markoting Associations
and thoir Business Divisions further general provisions on public con^

trol of agricultural products, such a.s ration cards for tho individual

foodstuffs, ration certificates, supplying tho Armod Porcos, fooding

para-military organizations and the Reich Labor Service, attachraont of
products undor public control of tho Reich,

1

It must be noted that both docroos aro containod in tho aforomontioncd secret draft of September 1938,

D. Barrq's Dofon.s£ tp^Aggrossjvo

Abpyq_ Proparatj-OM

According to Darro there could be no oggrossivo intont on his

part in conducting the proparatlons herein describod. Darro states!
1. All moasures In this program wore accomplished according
to a mobilization calendar and wero conductod entirely on

tho b'asls of prtparing for a dofonsivo war as is customary
in all countries.

2,

Reich Minister Schacht as the Minister of Dconomy and

Plonipotontla.ry General for tho War Pconomy was Darro's
suporior In this samo program. The Judgment of the IMT
hold th^t Schacht was not guilty of preparing for an

r.ggroBslvo war and that thoroforo Darro, who occupied a
minor position to Schacht, could not be guilty of this

U EA, C-412. ®»-5848,
?/ •W.yh

r. 413

16|-A

RG--&849, DB 162-A

S fl: 1007/ HID-X3190, DB 101, p. 51
3ii -

/ -Xd

sp.me charge.

It is "brought out in this respoct also

that if rearmainGnt of itself was not a- crime, certainly
food rationing measures of themselves could not ho
criminal,

3.

He was not guilty of planning or preparing for an aggres
sive war hocauso ho had no knowledge of any aggressive war

aims on the part of Germany and could not have had any

such knowledge hacauso (a) he w?^ too far removed from

Hitler's inner circle, and (h) all aggresrivs war
plans were intentionally kept from him.

1
S.

Prosocutj^onU ^&wer_to
In reply the Prosecution submits; •

1.

The Defense has offered no factual proof that the economic

mohilization program as applied to the prohlom of food,
was in connection with preparations for a. defensivo war. On
the contrary, the facts in this record shovr that there was

prepPrPtion for a wPr v/here the choice lay with GormP-ny.
The cold fact is that the defendant's participation in the

mobilization of the food and agricultural econony were di-

rectly tied up to Hitler's aggressive foreign policy of
which the defendant had knowledge and in which he partici

pated, Especially significant is the fs-ct that the dcfon—
dont Darre (who signed the law providing for the rostorS'tion of the ¥ehrmacht) accelerated his activities in

connection with the food and agricultural mobilization
after the invasion of Austria and at the time when proppra-

tions for the attack against Czechoslovakia were in the

making- The fact that five days prior to the invasion of
Polpnd, Darre ly decree sot in motion the food rp-tioning
system which ho had developed negatives any contention
that his activities related to prnparations for dofonsivo
war.

- 3^ -

2.

To the contention thfit Schncht was Darre's suporior and tha-t
in view of Scha-cht's acquittal there can he no finding of
guilt as to Darre, the sinplo answor is that the Defense over
looks the time factor.

The IMT with respect to Schacht speci

fically held that after the promulga'.ion of the Pour Yoa.r Plan
in 1936 Schacht lost his influence in the government and no

longer participated in the activities which contrihutod to
tho preparation for aggressive war.

^

The record with respoct

to Darro indicates that after Schacht was gone and no longer
participated in tho governmenti that ho, Darre, made his

c

greatest contributions to the preparations for war.

It was

in 1938-39 that Darre accelerated his grain storage program,

his food rationing program and the mobilization of agricultural

manpowor, and if Schacht is to bo takon as a standard to bo

applied then Darre,
J*.

in accordance wit^- that standard is

answerablo for hnvlng continuod in the preparations for aggros—

'ij

•

sivo wax when it became apparont to a man in his position that
tho policy of the Gorman govornmont was loading to war.

4

As

tho IMT found, tha,t fact bocamo apparent to Schacht in early

1937 and when it did ho withdrew from tho govornmont.

Darro

on tho other hand, when that fact bocamo apparent, exerted
groator energy and participated more in tho preparations for
aggrossivo war.

_Conclusipn

1.

Had Darro been opposod to Hitler's aggressive war aims ho,

among all Ministers, was in tho best position to obstruct

HitlorU plans.

Darro had ab8olTj.to control of tho German

food oconoT.'C'' and could havo impoded tho war preparations in

this field without creating any suspicion in Hitler's mind,
as Schacht had since Hitlor was not an export in this fiold,
had no intorest in the details of tho food oconon^, and was

- 36 -

concornod only with the results.

Df-rro chose to givo his
\

host in order that Hitler would "be free to conduct his foreign

policy in any manner ha saw fit.

S'or this choice he is to he

held rosponsihlG.

2.

Darro conpares favorably with Koss.

He was an active sup

porter of -preparations for wnr, signed the law of 16 March
1935 Gstahlishing conpuLsory military sorvico, supported Eit-

lor's policy of roarmament in many spoochos, knov; how dotormined Hitler was to realize his arahitions and how spt he

wa,s to resort to force in order to achiore his aims.

Ho had

cont^^-cts in Austria prior to the Mgchluss, followd the Gor

man troops into Vienna in March 1938 and extended the Reich
Rood Estate Law to Austria aftor the invasion.

3.

Darro hy his participation in the pro-invP^ion economic

phase necessary to thn attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia,.
Poland, Luxemhourg, Belgitim and Hollpnd had much in connon
with Runk ahd is principally distinguished hy having hogun
his activity at an earlier date, when the Nazi plans to wage

aggressive war wore heing fornulatod.
•d
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Th.3 Coirnon Plan a.nd Gon.^piracy

Pertinent Paragraphs of th^ Indictment

25 and 25

3u::_mary_of Ar_2U3cnt_

I

It yras not necessary for Barr-^ to attend any Hitler
conference in order to learn the a

Hitler.

xressivc plans of

Darrc' s worlc in the years prior to nitJ-er's

first conference had for its purpose re-buildin.e, of

•j-sreian

agriculture to the extent that jcrnan^^ would one

day be self-sufficient in foodstuffs.

Before Hitler

could convene his first conference he had to depend upon

Darre and the •3-ernan

agriculture to create a situation

which would 3;uarantec aere:any's food supply in the event

that Hitler's policy would lead to a war.

*

It was after

the Hattl-: of Production as launched by Barre had attained

^

sufficient success to insur" lernany's independence froei
food Inports that Hitler decided to .nove asalnst Austria

and Czechoslovalria.

Barre with hnowledje of Hitl~r*s

a.jsressive war plans pr'"pared the j-rnaxi food cconoeiy
t

for v/ar.

?AaTS:„

^

During the cross exaeilnation of Defendant Darrc he
admitted havins read c-rtain portions of Hein Hanpf d-al-

ir!3 principally with the agriculture a-^ctions and he also
admitted that he hnew ev^ry planh of tic Party platform
but he denied that he had any hnowledsc of Hitl"r*a aims
and ambitions.

Tar fact

that Darrc read the sections

pertainine to agriculture is sufficient to ahovf that he
realized Hitl-^r's int'-ntions and th-* latt-^r's belief in

- 30 -
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tb.e necessit3''

problems.

force as the neans of solvins international

Hitler was clear on this point, as can be de-

teruined fro":i tVie following quotation:
"The soil on V7hich v;e now live v/as not
a 3ift bestowed by Heaven on our fore

fathers.
They had to conquer it by
risliin^ their lives.
3o also in the
future, our people will no'': obtain
territory'", and therewith the neans of
existence as a favor fron other people,
but v/ill have to win it by the power

of a triumphant sword."

^

As to where this territory which was to be .needed for the

Ireater Reich was to be obtained Hitler was very explicit

t

vrhen he

stated;

"'Therefore we national Socialists have
purposely drawn a line through the line

of co.nduct followed by prewar G-ema/ny
in foreign policy,

'Je put an end to

the perpetual Ger'nanic march towards

the Southard 'lest ofTJurope, and turn
our eyes towards the lends of the East.

*'/e finally put a stop to the colonial

and trade policy of the pre-war times,
and pass over to the territorial policy
of the future.

.But when we spealc of new territory in

Europe today, we must think principally
of Russia and

to her.

the border states subiect

2/

Darre is definitely in accord with Hitler's policy in
obtaining the additional living space in the East,

1/
2/

5/

a.nd

II'IT, Vol. I, pa •e 16?
Vol. I, page 188
See NG-133^ VJh^rsin Darre states: "•.hether

the Geraan

wants to decide in favor of th® colonies or the Eastern

territoria.1 conception is by no aie-ns a matter of his
opinion or conviction but is principally a question

whose answer is decid-^d com;pletely rnd solely by the
foreign political ability of our government, l^hoever
wishes to have a serious say in th'^se matters ?t all
must first devote his '^n^-n-'gies to participate decisive

ly in the forel ,n policy of the state. The ways a.nd
possibilities of doing this need not be discussed
here.

. a.

M.'. ^

v4. .

for this r^r.son wr-s c.n ideal s^leotion in Hitl'^r's cr.binet

as the Reich Minister of Food c.nd Agriculture since the

uercan food question was the keynote to Hitler's policy
of expansion.

Hitler attached the greatest iaportanc^ to the Qer'zan

food problen in his plans to rebuild a greater Jsraany.
Concerning the seizure of living space on the continent

of Rurops, Hitler during the conference of 5 November
1937 stated:

"'It is not a case of conquering people
but of conquering agriculturally useful
space. It would also be uore to the pur
pose to seek rav; material producing terri
tory in lurope directly adjoining the
Reich and not overseas, and this solution
would have to be brought into effect for
one or two generations. . . .
Ihe history
of all t ine s - - Rona.n Rnpire , Bri t ish
B'cpire -- has proved that '"very spa,c^

'expansion can only be effected by break
ing resistance ?.nd taking risks.
Bvcn
setbacks are

unavoidable:

neither forrrr-

ly nor today has spac^ been found without
rn owner;

I

the attacker alv7r"s covccs up

against the proprietor.'"

1/

As to how tlernany was to solve this question of living

a
space Hitler stated:

"'The qu-'^stion for G-^rnany is where the
gr'^atcst possible conquest could be nad'

at the lowest cost.'"

^

In announcing his decision to -attack Pol-^.nd, -at the conf'-^r-^nce of 23 May 1939 HitlT ".dnitt-d that the quarrel
with Poland ov-^r Danzig was not the reason for this attack

but th^ necessity for G'^reany to enlarge her living space
and secure her food supplies.

During Hitler's conference
•' cQ

1/
2/

IMT, Vol. I, PHIT, Vol. I, p-^,

2/

Pood supplies vr-rc in fact i-.ve-dlately secured after

19.':
190

the invasion of Poland by dispatching a nu'Cbcr of
fararrs into this ar^a for thr^ sole purpose of bring
ing in the harvest aed building up the food pot-~nti-al

of Poland.

In this prograe D^rre played an active

role.

- Uo -

I

>1... ' *

.

of 23 A"ovr-.:br-r 1939 whll- discussing the problcn of ths

Ruhr P.nd its vulnornbility to nttc.ch by En^lr.nd r.nd Rrcnce

throu:5h Bcl3lu':i end i-Ioll-end, Hitler cnph-esized tlie feet
thet Enslend j could .not live without its inports.

spcahin^ for 'Icrneny he cnph?,sized:

'.Jhile

"Ve can feed our

selves. " ^
Hitler in Hein ICreipf discussed the G-err.an expansion
to
}

the Bast

when he

stated;

"'If new territory were to be acquired

w

in Europe, it nust have been n-ainly c,t
Russia's cost, and once a^ain the ncv;

k.

G-cr;.a.n Enpire should have set out on

its U'-^rch alon3 the sane road as was

fornsrly trodden by the Tei:';onic ir.ni3hts,
this tiac to acquire soil for the Gerv.an
plou3h by means of the German svrord
and

thus provide

the Hation with i t s

daily bread.'" 2/
Prior to Hitler's conference of 5 November 1937 we

note that Darrc is (1) advoca-tins a. policy of expansion,

(2) creatins the .necossary prerequisites for obtainins
a reserve of foodstuffs through his inau3uration of the

Battle of Production, (3} and si3nin3 a law for the
restoration of the "^fohr :iacht.

Darre by his prior a.cts

coupled with his express belief has indicated his state

of mind to be in accord with Hitler's policy.
Nithin a -.-.onth of the conference of 5 November 1937
we note Darre -addressin3 his subordin--te asenciss in order
to or3a.nize the German food economy for a total war.

On

the day followins the Hitler conference of 23 Nay 1939 we
note Dmrre requcstins a deferment for his personal ^^ssistant on the basis of his need for the happening of the

"a" case, Althou3h this was explained as a routine matter

1/
2/

lilT, Vol. I, pame 210

IMT, Vol. I, pass 214

- iil -
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. V,

the iiinist.er h"d to

psriodic^-.lly in order to rs-

tnln his st''^ff, it is the only evidence th:'.t we find of -defcrnent bein^ requested on the basis of the "A" case
occurrence.

Prior to this the testimony of Drrre has been

to the effect that the "A" case was an intsr^ral part of

the mobilization progro.m with no definite plans for a
I

;

tf-.'
rW'J

specific date in which all proposed pl^ns were' to go intO'
operation.

Now the - preparedness for mobilization was re^

presented as being in .effect by 1 1-iarch 1939,

1/

In dealing v/ith the four (4) .conferences of Hitler,

we must consider the conference of 22 August 1939 which
in itself w^s concerned ^"ith the decision to attach

Poland, which r.ttaok in the opinion of Hitler was based

on the necessity of Germany to enlarge her living space

and secure her food supplies.

Within a few days of this •
•

conference we find Darre pro'culgating his food rationing
decrees which according to an earlier plan provided for

K

the temporary period of the first four (4) weehs of the
war and followed by the permanent plan which was to be

come effective one (1) month later, na'm.cly 27 September'

1939.

iheso decrees, signed by Darre, were to cover

the entire food ratloning-progra-m for the duration of

the war.

D-'^rre, i-f he did not have a complete report

on the subject matter of this conference of 22 August
1939, was inform.cd of the decision reached at the con

ference ^nd instructed to put the food rationing pro
gram: in operation.

During the conference of 23 m^ovc :>

ber 1939 Hitler reviewed his past acoo/.pliphmcnts, be

ginning with hlH pv>]itio.c3 tacv since I9IS:, discussing
ths

1/

der :any from the o^eague of ITatlons,

Tr I8e39

liZ

'>V:

. - i i ' i i i f t i ' i i n'f

•

ve

the denunciation of the disc.r-".?.r-3nt conference, the order

of rcarv.n--.;cnt, the introduction of co"cpulsory r.rr.od sorvicG, th.G occupation of the Rhineland, the seizure of

Austria, ?,nd the action against Ozcchoslov?.hia -- with

all of which Darre was identified in his capacity of the
Reich 1-Iiniater of Food "nd Agriculture and Agricultural
Confidant of Hitler.

It was exactly three (3) days after

this conference that Darrs addressed a report to Hitler
on an agricultural plan v/hich had been requested by
G-oering and which was devoted to a Darre review of his

•accoaplishaonts

dbring his tenure of office =^nd which,

opened with the

sta-tcacnt

tha.t

"The whole v/orh of agrarian policy
since

the

seizure of power was al

ready doainatcd by the preparation

for a possible war," 1/^

As evidence tha.t the Reich Ministry of Food and Agri
culture continued to be infer.:ed about the aggressive
war plans of Hitler, we direct the attention of the

•T,

•Tribunal

to Exh 3392, IvG-53^7, which is contained in

Document Boofcs 211-A -and 162-A, stating:

"The Reich I-iinister for Food and Agriculture is busy aalting invegtig^-tions
with respect to the effects which the
occupation will have on the Geraan
food situatio.-Allegedly he has orders

to this effect '"^ircctly fro": the Fuehrer,"
The Reich I-iinister of Food a,nd Agriculture vras inforaed a.s

to the preparations ::adc x'^or the invasion of Luxembourg,
Belgiua.

nd

Holland bocausc of the need to determine the

effects of the occupation upon the Gcr".an food situation.

This requireucat w.as not a new development, or a

matter, of

very reoent origin but h'^-d existed prior to the invasioxi

1l'
V 1

of Austria, Tzcchoslovateia, Pb3.and, Denaarte and Hhrwa.y,

'

Txh 1C43, HG-

DB 102, p.

- 1^3 -
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Sines D-Trc, c.s the Reich Minister of /ood p.hd A5riculturs.
hrd a definite r.ssi^nnent In the pl-'^ ns for the invasion of

huxcnbours, Rel3iun end Holl-^nd he h=d to be ^iven the sciee
nssi^neent in the previous invasions nbove referred to.
Knowins the proninsvit pnrt thet the Screan food question •

ployed in all of the

plons ^nd -a^^ressive actions,

it osrt^^ihly follov^s that a ^overnncnt so conscious of
its food econony would h^ve completed a- survey of how
each invasion would effect the food e'conony within the
Reich,

D?rrc was the Reich hinister of Rood aed A^ri-

oulturs, his organization was the competent agency to
conduct this survey.

Ro other agency had the proper

facilities to carry out such an a.s2l3nnent.

There can

be no question but that the top secret document with
which we are here concerned was not

nista'ien in its re

ference to the Reich l-Iinistsr of Rood and A3riculture'
as the person charged with conductins the investi3ation

If:
i

of the effects that the forthco::in3 invasion would have
upon the Ger~an food eoonony.
Rood bec^ne the all important factor in Hitler's

/plans because of its s'peclal iaportanco to the Icr'/.an

people.

The people of Rcraany v/crc particularly conscious

to the possibility of a food bloqlcade with its resultins
food shorta333 such as existed durin3 l7orld h'ar-I.
be rid of this thrct of a food

To

blockade "^nd an enclrclc-

acnt of Icraany, it bccaac necessary to develop the
Icraan food potential to the extent th^^t it would be in-

aepcn-^ent froa outside aourcea,

The hunger psychosis

-as'sooiated with the years IRlA-iRiS was not to be liRhtly dismissed by th-^ Hazi pi-:iner3.

It was for this rc-

son th.-^t the priaary ai-a of Hhzl v/"r preparations was the
creation of a food reserve -nd the atf^ln-cnt of Icr.-any'g
self-sufficiency in food.

Before Hitler would have coa-

— [fli

w'li'j

plct'3 frsGdo:: in his foreign policy, 3-er.3C,ny's food supply

hnd to be ^ucirentccd.

The cxpcricncGS seined durin.T ••/orld

.\1

.f;.p I v/hcn the bpeeLcdown in ths lore-'^n food econony pcsuit
!•

ed in- the loss of the v/ar wore to prevent e reo^tition of

•V-

si ..Her situation in the jrcrv.p.n food ooono",y er-inlv be —
3-'"uge (1) G-er-inny 'ni^ht ej-ein lose the vr^.r e.s it hed in

1918, when occordins to the lern-n version, the tereinetion
of'host ilities was nerely a ratter of r. cease fire order,

§
'9

caused, by the collapse of the hone front due to the'food

3hort-"^;e

the idea that 3er::a,r!y had suffersd a 'rilitary

reverse durins '.'orld 'far I was never accepted by leraany's

professional soldiers -nd (2) the people of leraany were
not likel^r to be persuaded to enter a war in which their

, ..-id
\

food supplies v/cre not :5uarar.teed a.nd where there- existed
n possibility of a repetition of the food shortae.es ex
'H, *1

•hi

perienced during 1914-1913.

'

v'

{

In su::r.arizi.nj;, we state that it was for the purpose
.of obtainin.s sufficient living space for the •3-errans and

by so dolns to provide the ajricult.ural territory necessa
ry

feed the her am people that Hitler formulated his

V

plan to obtain space outside of G-craany's borders, even
beyond those old boundaries of 1914.

.As to tlx question

where this space was to be obtained, Hitler early decided

upon discardln3 a colonial policy in favor of saining space
In the east -- this apace vacs p-rtioularly to be obtained
at the expense of Russia ^nd her border states.

To acoo---

plish the plan as outlined in licin Kampf, Hitler required
a full-sized army since it would bc_ necessary to the ful«-

fllacnt of his plans that Icr my's armed -.i^ht should
Qta..-id poised, first to threaten jie^tipiio not c,co.o-din3 to

G-er.:any's torritory Uoaanda,, and SGoond, to be ready tn the
event that this policy led to war,
build tir-ls .araiy.

Dcrre enabled Hitler to

.

• -, 11

'-•ri'.T
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Darre's iOaov/ledKS of Hitler's A^xressive Plans

A.

Austria

Prior to the invasion of Austria, Dsrre had identified
hi~.sslf with the ijasi uoveaent in that country and the

efi"'orts to brins ab«ut the Anschluss.

In 1933 Darre had

an or3anization functioning within Austria as reprcscnt'a1/''
tivss of his Office for Agrarian Policy,

Inaediately

prior to the invasion of Austria Darre spent approximate

ly six (5) weolta in a clinic at Berchtesgaden v/here he

allegedly was being treated for fish-poisoning (bo.;gthing he had contracted about a yc^r previously in Italy)
a.nd during which ti :c he had every opportunity to visit
Oberealzburg and did re .main in direct contact with his
Berlin office.

Darre has testified to the fact

that he

learned of the Austrian invasion for the first time on
the morning' of 12 liarch 193S when German troops aarched

past his hospital in Berchtesgaden in th,s direction of

f

Austria.

Dr. Zabel who was In charge of the hospita,! at

I

Berchtesgaden offered his sworn statement describing

Darre ' s arrival in Berchtesgaden, sc-crecy surrounding
his v i s i t

-and

the f^ct

-^hat

an offici-al car had

boon

sent

2/
from Obersalzburm
for Darre.
o

It has been cstCvblished

that during Darre' s stay at Bcrchtcsg-adcn the Austrian
Chancellor Schuschnig visited Hitler -at Cbcrsalzburg
where an attcmot wa.s

• (*,

V ,N.'(

a.adc to Intia.id-ate hi:: by a show '

Of Geriany's aillt-ary night.

3/

Of course, Darre denies
,">i

th-a^ ho bird been in Cbcrsalzburg .or knew anything -about

3ce tcBtim.ony of witness Hcischle, TR. 24265
B.xh. 3683, inD-156lT, DB 161-A
IMT, Vol.

I, p. 193
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thG visit of Schuschnlg but it still rev.ains that ho spent

. this ti-ne in Cbersalzburg, that Hitler laiew he was there,
and that there was an official car" sent dovm for hia.
Darre, by virtue of his position as the Z^eich ^'linister

of Food and Agriculture and Reich Peasant Leader, had to be

Informed of Hitler's invasion plans fo'r Austria, since the
annexation of Austria in,addition to creating an iaia.ediatc

j-ood problea: for G-ornany and Austria, was a possible throo-t

to the entire G-craian food oconoay by requiring .'-orc food
than the Reich was then in a position to supply.
I

But the

ilazi planners were not lc-a,ving this to chance. Xhe entire

food situation in Austria had been surveyed during the
years -and the Austrian food resources v/ere carefully ob
served by the G-ern-an agricultural export in the cabassy

at Vienna.

1/

^
^
Cf particular iaport-ance is the aanncr in

which tne Austrian agriculture was absorbed by the Reich
i^ood Fstate and also how the. leading personalities of the
Hasl agricultural organisations were appointed to posi
tions with the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture.

B.

Cze Gho s lo va Ic ia.

Thsv Ozcchoslovakian invasion can be oonsiderGd in two

parts, (1) the political situation arising prior to -the
signing of the Runich Pact and (2) the actual invasion of

Boheala and .^oravia on 15 i.arch 1939.

Prior to the sign

ing of the Uunich Pact, Barre was particularly active to

gether with the Reich i-Iinister of the Interior, Frick, In
drafting the ncceasarj^ decrees that were to launch a food
rationing progra-a in the eveut

the nolltioai situation

created by Hitler would lead to war.

In this completed

1/ See teatiuony of Haushofer, TR. 2395^, explaining how.
his Austrian assignment furnished hi"-: vrith complete

insight into tho Austrian food situation.
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plan the deadlins set for the operation of the program was
15 October 193? which ci^ht have been of significance if the

powers considered, 'did not a,-jree to Gfervany's annexation of

the Dudetenland.

2/

'•

hccordins to Darrc's order of 11 February

1939 the 'leraan ^raln econcv.y was to subait a serios of re
ports of their views on the -changes "to be oxpocted in the
or-ain and fodder supply situation in the event of wa-r.
-^ocordi,n3 to the hypothetical military and political situa
f\

t

tion,

It

and a.ll of the a3cnGies concerned were siven anywhere free:

the outbreak of war on l-.^pril 1939 was to be assuecd

24 hours to 72 hours in w'^.ich to coT.pls.tc and suba.it their
reports.

.-iCccrdin^ tc-Darre,

the entire arransca.ent was

executed on the order of Goerin^ who in turn had been great

ly concerned with the Gereisn .3rain ccono-ay of a state ucnt of
United States Senator Pitt'aann previously referred to.

It

is si3nifiGant that all of these preparations vrere alle3edly in conjunction v/ith the "h" case while as a natter of

0

fact they served to nake "ready the Geraan grain econon.y for

f

any possibility that "•.i3ht arise due to the occupation of
Boheaia --nd Horavia by Gcrnan troops on 15 harch 193?.

G.

Poland.

All of the preparations in the Geroan food cconouy
that had been ;:ade for vrar were'placed in operation prior
to the actual invasion of Poland, bsin3 effective on 27

.iiU3ust 1939.

Prepa.ratlona for war had been .lade,' '^nd

'

reached their final stage exactly five (5) days before
the attack began.

Darre adviits the preparations were

in fact nade but clalns that all preparations had been

•-lade

on the basis of an absolutely defensive war.

i^iow the

1/ Sxh. 1C32, UG-465, DB 102, p. 55
_2/ See pane
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war against Poland has been deterr.ined by the IZ-IT to be an
aggressive war. yet all the preparations ^.ade prior thereto
were aofually placed in operation at this tine.

Darre had

prepared for v/ar^ p. war in fact did occur and it v;as the

preparations cs conpleted b3'' Dsrrc that were ready and "r.a,de
effective in oonjunction with the attach upon Poland,

The

Prosecution supports the view that Parre prepared fcr that
eventuality that cane to pass^ the outbroaE;: of war.

Due

V

to the saac factors that aerited a thorough study of the
food problcr.a effecting the C-eri^an econony by virtue of
the occupation of the invaded territory, Darre had to hnow
that plans were in order for . the invasion of PolancJ.

hs

to the decision to strike a.nd xvhen. Hitler was not hiasclf

sure as to the actual date until 22 .-iugust 1939, after
which Darre elso knew of the decision reached.

Darre's

activity i"r::ediately following t ae invasion of Poland, when
he sent hundreds of Deraan farners fron the Helen into

Polp.nd in order to secure the harvest and to prepare for
the next year's crop Is sufficient evldsnoo to prove that

Darre was not only infdrued of the plan to attack, Poland

but was instructed as to his assignment when the attack
took place.

D, Luxembourg, Bolglun and Biolland.
In the top secret files of the d-erman '/ehr::acht we

find reference to the fact that of 2C January 1940, the

Reich iilnistry of Food and --igriculture was busy making Invcsti.gatlons with respect to the effects which the Occupa

tion would have on the Jernan situation.

The report also

stated that the Reich Hlnister allegedly had orders to this

effect directly from the Fuehrer.

Herein we find the reason

why Darre In his capacity as Reich -ilnister of Food and

-
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'

^griculturo had to be ij:3for-:^Gd of Hitler's invasion prior
to thoir exGoution in order to safesuard the o-er'Jian food

econcny. frcn any dctri^aentel sffeota ca,used by the cocupation and the ultimate annexation of the food 8Cono'.iy in .

the invaded territories.
in3 its food

Oer.iany's problem of safesuard-

supplies and food reserves paramount in

Hitler's quest of ^alnin^ additional living space and. by
so doing to provide G-eraan agriculture v/ith a. solution to

0

the problem of natclng '.Treatcr G-erv.a.ny self-sufficient in
its food supply.

4r

• 1

Oonolusionj_

The above ovidcnoe cstabliahos, we subait, that the

dofcndant Darre substa-ntially participated in the plan

£.•

ning and preparation for waging wars of aggression through
his activities in his 'specialized field of food and agri
culture.

0

Vc have previously indicated, that the sar.ie evidence

has been introduced both for dount I (pla.nning, prcpara-

tion, initiation and waging) as for Count II (oonspiraoy),
and hP.VG called attention to the fact that under the

standards of the IHT, qua-ntua of. pr'oof necessary for a.
conviction under the respective counts, nay be diffcre.nt,
1

In connection with the "conspiracy" count wc call
attention to the fret that Darrc was a'Minister of

Hitler^ a frcii the early days of the Mazi seizure of power,
hold a high civil and political office and had IcnovJlod^ic
of secret laws particularly the ccnsci^iptlon and mobili
zation laws of iiprll 1935, and the secret defense law of

21 laay 1935 which set up the administrative macViinery of
the govern-lent for the conduct of war*

In fact tha t

secret law net forth the authority and jurisdiction of

-

5G -

.lyAv?

'•^V'ig

-t-

Darre and ho operated under that secret law in his special
sector, llthoush Darro was not present at the oonfcrcncos

whore Hitler v.adc hnown his specific a^jrcsslve plans, yet'
the adainistrativc activity of Darro in point of tiae is
so closely related to the decisions aadc by Hitler in these
conferences, that•the'conclusion is inescapable that he

had knowledge of aggressive pl=n3, otherwise the fact that

4V
I

I
'b

y

his administrative decrees iaoediately followed each of
these oonferonces would be attributing to the element of

chance -much -ore weight than the law of averages calls
for. lie conclude therefore-that the evidence shows a
sufficiently close connection of the defendant Darre with
the select Hitler circle, to warrant the finding of guilt
'Ci-lso under the "Gonspire.cy" oount.
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Pertinent Paragraphs of the indictment:
38, 40, 44 and 46,

liMT PXC2BPTS,

"Prom the earliegt days ofithe ^S2ip, anti-Genitisn
had occupied a prominent place in 21 ticnal Socialist
th.ught ani propaganda, '.'?he Jews, v^ho were considered

tohave no right to G-ernian citizenship, were held tc
have^ heen largely responcihle r the tr^^uhlp with vrhich
tne hation was afflicted follo^-dng the'war of 191-i-18.

Furtheri.iore, the antipathy to the Jews lyas intensified "by
the -insistence which was laid uroon the superiority of the
'jermanlc race and "blf od. !]?he second chapter of Ercic 1 of
• -Hein Ea. .pf> is dedicated to v/hat nay "be called the
Masuer Pace' theor^^', the doctrine of Aryan Sunericrlty

1
I

over all - ther races, and the. right of G-erraans in virtue

<

of this superiority to dcinina.te end use other peoples

♦

for their oim ends, "'ith the coning of the ilazis into
power in lDr^3, persecution of the Jews "becarae official

state policy, ®n 1 April 1933, a "boycott of Jewish enter

prises vrac apprr-ved hy the Ifesi Hoieh Cabinet, and during
the following yscors a series of anti-Semitic laws was
passed, restricting the activities of Jews in the Civil

service, in the legal profession, in ,1curnalism and in
the arned forces. In September 1935, the so-called
ITuremberg Lavrs vrere passed, the n^^ct iaToortant .effect of

which was to deprive Jews of German citizenship.

In

this Vfay the influence of Jflwish elements on the affairs
of Germany was extinguishod, and one more "ootential source

of opposition tc Hazi policy was rendered pov/erless."

Internatiorial Military \'rib\uial,
V' lumo I, Pages 180-181,

"The anti-Jewish policy was frrnulated in Point 4 of
the Party Prograii which declared" only a member of

the race can bo citizen, A member of the race can only

t

be one vrho is cf Goman blood, without ccnsiderat-ion of
creed, .•onaeqiiently, no Jew ca,n be a member cf the race,"
tner jpoints of the program declarod that Jevjs should be

reate-L as foreigners, t>iht they should not be p-zruitted
office, that they..whculd be excelled fri^n

•he Seich if it were inpcasiblo to nourish the entire

p.-p^ation of the Gtate, that they should be denied any
l^irtaer imigraticn into Germany, and tha.t tliey should be

^)V'

pron 1 ed from publishing German newsnaners, The I^azi
party preached thcce dretrlnos throufrhnut itg hlstcry.
G-

uoTOer and other publications vrere allowed t-" dis-

End in the s-oeeclios and
piblic declarations of the Fazl
leaders,' the Je^s were
held np tc pxibli-. ridlniae and c^ntoo^t;"

International Mil^'tary d'r1bun.'4

Volume.1, page 248,

I
ii''•-

>?

-: >fi

. "'4

Prosecution Document Bocks IJo.. lOS and. 'm* 104 in support of

the e.hove portions of the Indictment have estahlished the follo^-rin;^
facts:

_ Darre, a prolific •'^rritex' and phhlic speaker, was one of the

leading anti-Seraitos during the period cf the ^'hird

using his

state and party offices as ^'ell as his pers'^nal Influence to advocate,
.V

support end accomplish the aims of the ilOBAp plan to eliminate the
Jew — politically, economically, and physically.

Prom aracng the numhor of speeches ielivered hy Darre during the
years of the dhird^Peich, those made upon the occasion of the annual

Beich Peasant lay are typical of his anti-Semitic vieors and of his

desire to persuade the memhors of the Hcich Pood Estate to he feithr-

4

ful tc his theories.of "Blood and Soil",

As proof that larrc exerted his personal influence in furtherance
of the program to eliminate the Jews, the Frosecuticn offered a

ccaiectio-n o.f Parre's speeches at the Reich Peasant Days 1933 tc 1938,
puhlished in hook form in ISunder the title "Heawakoning of the

f

Peasantry", throughout all these speeches Darre emphasises his theory
tliat the Jevs are a hostile race and opposed to the hatter interest

of the G-orman nation, the following statoraents are typical of Darre's
philosophy '^n this Question?

"The Jew is hy oatuir-, net gifted with the faculty f^r
real constructs

w.^rk and throu.gh'^ut the whole of

nistory has given proof that he dees n^^^t even consider

1

it important to. he so gifted. As, hb.wever, he must

keep^h^dy^and soul togothcr, he does v.herever circumstances

perni't this ^^olaying^_an i.n_ter^med_ia^_rp_lj3 in_thG_'-rprk
Ai^liehs_-^'-ltliOut_h£vi.ni; lo_v/crk hi^^elf, This is .trade. And

as all trade dopends on constructive v.',->rk, it draws the Jev/ like
a magnet tc where ccnstr-.\ctive work is in operation and thore

is a pros;-r.ct of earning something hy trade," U
Coirparing the
nan and Jev/isU
"P^rhap,s n^vw ny rojirjoncing
that it IS not a ITati'^'&a^
which is in conflict with

idf^a, c.,f vro.rkj
remarks will "be miderstood,
Pocualj ct econ'^'iio the'^ry
a lihGra.'. eo-n. mic theory,

hut that here tvro econrmic theories, ^etermj.ned_"by
r_a_ce, stand in opposition to oach other,

Xj P-di. 1A65, TO>-14875, DP 103, p, 20.

-
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On the one

I'land, the idea of vrork originating from the rocta of
peasantry, an , idea G-grman and iiryan, wi"ich has given
hirthto the conception of the honor of v/ork, "based
on knovd.edge and a"bility, just as tme for the peasant
as for the craftir.an, the entrepreneur and the mer

chant, On ihg o,thei h^nd__ the Jex-f, d^endent on trade
for trade's sake, woo fries to dominate nations

through money which has received its own value, through
the financial institutions as well as the fortress
commanders of those financial institutions. Our

Stiehrer once expressed this thought in his lapidary
liquid style as follox^st ''^iie_drj;/-_2n_think^ ^f_w£rk as_
j^he ha^i^ ©r_pre^ervin^ naii£n^_s£lJ,ditj^,_the_J^w_aR.
r T.ean^ of exploiting other nations." 1./
National- Socialist attitude:

l_Pur_a^t^tud^ t,o__the^idea ^f_bl,o_od_and_race. hnno^e^
jlS'i]iely_the_inej.capa'bXe_dut;^

2P-X,

at_ti^u_de_cl_ear]^y_t_oxtfarJ.s_j^X'-ash _hl_po_d. This

do as

Fational Socialists, "but we must also do it as PeasrUt

headers.
i

4

Jsvrry originated in nomadism. Jexvry, there

fore, "because of its "blood, can never fulfill anything

"but the laws of nomadism. The law of nomadism, hoiyever,
is the cropping off of the mea-dow of parasitism on the
fruits of the labor of other nations. Th_e
^f_
:Qeasan_tr^,__hpxirey^r_L j;S_the_t_ill^ii^j_ cultJ,vati_on and
ur_es,^rvati_on__o_f _t3ie ^il. ^ntius^^ed ^o_i_ts^car_e,_The_

^,nti^hes_is^b_et_we_en_p^a_^aritry_ajid_J^x-7ry_h_ere be_come^
_obvipu^)_is ^"b_so_lu^e__a_nd_in^rmoun_fcatl_e,"
Pemember Peasant:

—^^'^Xe_the_j£Xir_rul.^,Sj__ ^h^-peasanjt iui^t_dJ.ej^" 3./
The Battle —Jex-r versus Peasant:

The Jextf knox-rs from a thousand years^ experience that
there can never be peace between him and the peasantry.
-Lh-erefore Jexifry destroys the peasant wherever it can,

and persecutes the peasantry with the deep—seated
hatred of its racec

believe that more correct than

the statement thi.-f- t-h^- racial question is the key to
an understanding of world history, is the assertion

)

_that_the_pplar_ddffaience bejfcvreen neas^jbrjv and JoKPy
^nd y i^e_v_er^a_has_only; Ju.j,t r^ell^ ^et, yorlj. hi^tyry
J.n_m^tyorn"
Parre concludes:

'L^he^leadershjr) of the Peich Pood "Hlstate has ,draxirn thp
conclusion from such realizations, that xvhere the

G-e^i'man peasant is to live and prosper, the Jex^r and
his economic methods may not nrevail, Th^r^f^r^
i:e£0j.v^d_a^ |[aiion£l_S£cj,ali^t^ and as_r^snonslbl.
1/ Ibid,. T). 22--33
3/ Ibid., p, .32
3/ Ibid. . p, 32

i/ Ibid. , p. 33

-
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-Jrffu..-

i)ath_in t.k^s_dir^cii£n_

imrerturtaWyj. J0_that

no^ oray_tl;e_G-^rnian _'

Tie^sanir^i^ ^afe^ar^e^,_'but_in _it^ £aTia^iiy_a^
_
l;i_fesp_ring_o^ _th_e 2l'^j:;ii^;an_riat_ion,__als^
naiion_and_hen^e_th3_ho.l2;,_.et.eTn^_%ird_S^ich_of oar

£u^hrer,j.A4olf_Hitlex.'' 1./

^

Peasants must "be ITational Socialists:

"'i'herefore, wherever Jewry assumes control, the working
and value—producing section of the commiinity must

perish, Jewy ha.s the same effect here as a'pestilential
"bacillus which enters a healthy hocl^y*. Let us not he
deceived here. One does not comha.t a pest hy ea.tii^
with it out of the same dish." 2/
Parre rejects Marxism:

"Since, however, l-ferxism came into heing in accordance
vrith the law of Jevrry, it, hence commanism too, will
and must he the eternal enemy of the peasant. Por

neasardr^ and Jewr^ arv3 as_dafjFe^ent__aj. fiXG^^jld^^wat^r^
I
A

if i^ussia let-B

its peasants starve in order quite

logically to feed the Jewish overlords in Russia and

their tools, the armament industry, the Army and the
Secret Police, it is just as logical from the Jevrish

standpoint of vievr as in G-e^rnhny the Puromherg L^iv/s and
Reich B'eredita.ry Parm Law are for the protection of

Jerman hlood."

j^/

On Jev/ish democre®/:

"Ihe Jewish democracy, whatever form it takes in a state,
means nothing more or less th n the up rooting pjid handing over of

f

peasantry to Jev/isli morxey thinking, to Jewish stock-exchange
sp eculat i on."

On avowing oneself to the peasantr"*'*:

'-Jut

one does want to avow oneself to peasantry,

such a peasantry -.as no

'

It must" eith.;r recognise

the mortal hogtii.:ty ef jJowish parasitism or it will

perish sooner o::
hy rea.scn of this parasitism.
This iron law of all peasantry is valid for all nations.
Therefore, today in -Surope the fateful huur has struck

to ca.ll Upon the solidarity of the entire Puropea.n
p.jasantry to fight its one cud only enemy, theJew and

his instruments of power, w^lch are most obviously
e^qjressed in the Soviet Russiou a.rmy,"

X/ Ihid, p. 3?

a/
a/
4/
a/

Ihid.,
Ibid,,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

p.r;.
p.
p,

AO
40
43
45

• 'i
i-

^'inal shovm •- dovn with Jevjrv:
.

Jiiihsy_t£ ^3£0£,nizs tha vital lavre

Goa ana_henco_the_oau^a_of

I^d"'h
f:tJ^

tha vital laws_of our hnmaniV ~

Je7a-y.
The
aer^ peasantry therefore "P™
takestteitsBieroy
st^dof.dth
I^lf
- tl.r. We are entering upon a final sho-^dovm with

P-^-santr.,
certainand
that
^I" I -all ftriumph,
as the suntriumphs
over night,
iiie over death:

-"^nd we do all tais v;ith the cryi

Everything for our Gorman people:
Everything for hdolf Hitler." l/
of the Office for agrarian Policy

set forth the general policy^of his office on the Jewish auestion in
4

his letter of 18 ..pril 1939."' In discussing "Bevorenoe of Work"
Earro states:

\

i

^

II Znr u

I

alre-^dy said what is essontial

l^^tween 1935 and 193^!. particularly in

"h •

^-sically there are only two t.^'ues of human

Th 1

™sn being who consumes values without working.

I

produces values "by his work

-u," first^type begins with the tiller of the soil, as he,
first creates the prerequisites to

a o wor in any form at all to be performed for any

ength of time; the second type begins with the human being
As o
. +..^ nr^ v,.-,4-,.
"ir-Mc uof^xiia
w-Loii
I
_ .
. .l.a.e nuraan
_ . . Dema
°
f
parasite
on
nature
without
any
activity
of
his
o^m,
particularly in tne case of the nomad.' The first type was'
_
wno

•ni-p-Pir.+

^ -5

.

j-ne tirst type v;as

mZfnA'
in -.ryanism, the this
second
in Jewry.
The in
Old'Te^ta-'"^•yyyyy^P'^esonts
ago-old
contrast
tho
sonT % f"
shepherd) apd -hel (the tiller uf the

h^liU

therefore hegins in the history of

OOT
parasite,
himself
of nomad),
work, yet
oovoyng
the values
of another
raajilsinoapahle
lahor (the

In^r^,.
preduces
values (the
order tvwo
to ge^ at hi,-,
pussossions,"
s/ tiller of the soil)
Earre continues:

\"

J.

Other^hand
the opposite of the -.ryan,
thec.Voi"bJ-On
Jew,
l^ita^logically
•
A
" built up hig ideology on
uii his a.versi

, « 1

iv

curse and consequently
t..e Jew develops parasitism into isthea essence
of his
primitive man can do, namely

the Vew th-! u?°u

world by parasitism, becomes for

he
t-n sdevour^
^
religious
he v/ont
wants* to
all the nations.
It sov«UHpirationst
In t.h..

Bibiei

nations. It says so in the

a straight

hh. „ -1

-htr +v,o w, j

|v. "

arfJV t

"work" and "parasitism"

tr"

s- to
order character-^
-- i/Oday^s econumicecuxiumic- oraer
cnarac^.

the division of labor, an
idelogical°f recognition
of labor .;nd

i/ ibid,, p, 46

a/ Ex. 1S46,. r(l-l385, DB 103, n. 41

2./ ibid,, n, 44..
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"hence one which logically must •oroceed from the labor
of the peassjit in order to end in an ordered economy

(Marketing Order of the Heich iFood Sstatej fferketlng
Order of the Hanseatic League, J^conomic Order of-^cient
®Sypt, etc,): on the other h^d an economy of the -carasite.
•^Very economic order, regardless of its origin, v/hich falls

to Jev;ish domination ends hy the "host" nation oecoming a
trading nation through liheral or "manchestar" methods,
finally, if the corresponding -Drerequisites are given, to
"be mined "by advanced capitalism domina.ted "by the hanl^s." 1./

Larre, hitter in his denunciation of the Jews, went to gree.t length
to place the hlame and rosponsihility for (lermanj^s ills and mis

fortunes Upon them, *in exanple of how far Larre would go to hring
discredit upon the Jewish Race is found in his book "Swine Murder",
/

in effect an atteirpt to place the loss of ^^orld V/ar ^ squarely upon
the shoulders of the Jevrs,

I

^

J

"The G-ermon people in the Third Reich has, however, the
right to he informed regarding these events, so that by this
exairple, it vrill recognize the pernicious part played bj'" the
national tra.itors — the Jews —who literally caused 750,000
conpatriots — innocent mothers, children, old and infirm
men and v/omen _ to starve inthe war years 1914 to 1918.

Left dead onlhe "home bat tie—field" were three quarters of
a million G'ermans, who could hve been saved in uort if the
Jews had not willed otherwise. The ma'^.n lesson v;ith the

&G^ina.n pecple must draw from a conteirplation of the Swine
^iurder, from the point .of view of history as well as
economy, is plain; ib must keep its ears scrupulously and

perpetrually closed to Jewish counsellors and theorists-" S./
2^''ot content with the measures directed ago.inst the Jews in his
capacity of Reich litnetiter o:^ Rood and -agriculture and Reicli Reastrjit

Leader, Lo-rre devotee his clma cijnd literary efforts to a series of

anti—Jewish articles published in newspapers and periodicals which he
supervised, edited and distributed throughout G-erraany. In addition,

his articles were widely published and circulated by news services and

news agencies engaged in the business of selling newsprint* While many

of Darrens anti-^Semitic articles were penned prior to the outbrealc of
he continued after the commencement of hostilities to \«xrite and
publish his articles, stressing his theories of race and blood and

directed against the Jew as the natural enemy of a true G-jr •'au.

Larre used his publications "RS Landuost" and " Odal" to bring his

L! IbttU, p> 45
2./ Ex. 1047, lTTIP-12498, IB 103, p. 121,
-
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articles to the attention of the puhlicj snccseding
reviewed and conunented upon favorahly in other

similar editorial policy,

l/

-

_ '

! .

rnniraii<3riori^'' 5 '
** t^.'pical article ^-arre /iailtled ''Breeling as a ou - g2.z;in

published in the November 1940 issue of his monthly
for blood and soil ''Odal"

staged;

•''since the Jev7ish*peopl.r claim for themselves and^thei
blooi a special position among the rations, and siac^
the de-^'-'sh peopt-o

t.he. ^n^st.ip.n_o,f ih^3.r

wHh_theiab_cladm. '£r_v/pudd_domnation, there ar:-

consoQUcntly and imperatively the necessity for

iTationad Socialism to give speci.l. consideration to
this claim of Jewi'y to world domination based upon

•lewish bloodo -.1.1 special cha.racteristics of the

wevrish people thopie^by; fixsi assurae_an dd^o3^og.ic.^i -^"^-^

henc„e basiu, .ipnortan^e^ and conpel National Social^®
answer the whole Jewish question likevrise from a

'

and idelologica-1 noint of vievf, even whera ,apcaran"i-donly "oolitics and the economj'' are concerned."'

it/

^ol anti-Jewis'

Darre's articles vere . .-ceived. as part of the gene «•

vin "orcvisod his

campaign and reviewed by other anti-Semitic tA/riters wny p

analysis of and ideas pertaining to, race and blood s.s

the bnshs for

'^orma.n solidarity^ Darre had to know that his articles v/oro

S

e7i.ploited by the JTShiiP press in appealing to all Oerranns to J *
campaign of hate.

lte.rre's statement, above, received this comment".
I

t was preciseely at the --right moment that S, Walt^itr— iii
drew attention in his essay "Breedirxg as a doinmandmenr

vjhich has just appeared in the Fovenber edition of the
monthJ.y magazine ''Odal'', to this de^-isive relationship
vrhich .-i^^ational Socialism has repeatedly placed i-'

,

foreground of its political consideration- "'^he q.uesta:on
of blood is the pivot of the entire tTational Socialist
ideology.. The creator of tTatibnal Socialism, our

)

l^iehrer -.dolf Hitler,'has stated his opinion on this

matter so clearly and definitely th-a.t .really no doubts
need arise. One cani'Ot be a National Socialist: and at

the same time believe tlu.'t one c£in sidestep'the blood

V

question intellectually, spiritually, or in reality of
of our existence." ^^hat points of view are decisive, and

ai

• what conclusions v/e have to draw when conside:.-ing the

Jev;ish question from this angle co.n^est be shown if wo
follov/ the trains of thought of Earre's fundamental
essay "Breeding as a Commandment". 3/

In the eyes of the leading Hazis, Barre mada'a magnificent con
tribution to the anti--Jewish problem - he .afforded the tjerraan mind a

1/ Sx, 1664, lTa..l333, I3B 104, p. 34
a/ Il3id. . p. 36
a/ Ibid. , p.

'
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scientific reason for agreeing to the elimination of the Jeiv — he

creD.tt;d a flimsy pretext for the acceptance of a violent coii^aAgn th£:t
offered as its ullimata gcel the "betterment of the &erman culture and

the 'lermcn race.. Because of Darrens approach to the Jewish q_uestion,
the G-eriran mind was ahle to acc^t anti-Semitism and all it entailed,
since it now "became a question of survival — "as the Jew to survree
and dominate the v/orld or was the G-ermsn to survive and arthifeTcworld
doBiination.

"Blood has risen up against "blood: and this is t^-e question
her^.'

Is the world to "be filled with Jev/ish "blood, the

"blood of the parasitical, scavenging and therefore cultureless Jewish humanity, or is the world to he filled with

the creative hlood of aryan man, the mon of nordic hlood,
the man who is ahle to administer law and order "by reason

of the lavjs of his hlood?"

%

1''

Barrels theory is re-nee.ted':

"The decisive hlow arainst Jev/ry v;as struck hy the
I'Uromherg Laws. The Gradual exclusion of the Jews
from public life v/euld hcve remained ineffective as
an outward measure, if intervention had not talcen

place at that point whore Jewish destruction is most
dangerous, in the matter of maintaining the purity of
the German hlood» ^or National Socialism, the Jewish
q.uestion was not a matter of religion, hut v;as to he

understood" only as o. q_uestion of "Blood and lace". —11
the measures on the elimination of the Jew from public

life passed, in Germany sinco the I'uremherg Baws, arc
purely executive measuresy i.e^ outward manifa:^tations
of this fundamental act of legislation. The fact tha.t
several hundred thousand Jews a.re still living in the

G^3rma.ri space today, does not rJ-ter the fact that our
country is practi-eally freed from Jewish influence.
I'Dr'the future there merely remains the conplotion of

the measures being con;;inu,ously carried on, wMch will

he concluded with the emigration'of the Is.st Jew." S./

%

2^/ Ihid„. p. 37

2./ Ibid., p. 38-39.
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The solution:

"The fight continues® The Jevdsh question will "be solved only
when there is'no longer any Jew ahle to exercise his disinte

grating influence on the continent„ Th^
^ews was started long ago as a consequence of the
iTationol Socialist Jewish policy. It has made considerahlo

progress during the first year of tbe v/ar,"

1./

The foregoing definitely proves Darrens attitude toward the Jews an
establishes him not only as eji outspoken opponent of the Jew hut a v;ill

participant in the program to eliminate the Jew from the eonomic and '

V'

social Iffo* of G-erraany. There can he no question hut that larre 'jpproved

of and co-:perated in the legislation directed against the Jevrs which v/as
in accord with his entire attitude on this subject.

Do-rre denies that his citings ajid speeches had any effect upon

the solution of the Jewish problem within the Third Seich, Darre states

,)

tliat the Prosecution does not understand his vievpoint as expressed

in his article on Jovjry and that a proper interpretation of "those

o-rticles would show thr;'" To.rre couldn't possibly write tha,t the G'ei'maii
people should take the Jews as a model bat that he said this indirectly

by demanding the German people subject themselves to, the same lav^s
of breeding as the" Jewish people had been doing for thousands of yeons-.:.

Y

hlo answer Is needed to such a novel aPToa.cl" to anti-Semitism,

UTttj^Z^T^OF OF_JJWI.Sh iiGHI^iaTGF^^PHC^^RTY
legislation designed to eliminate the Jevr from the economic life

of S'ermany v;as introduced in form of decrees requiring all Jewish .
property to be reported for the purpose of effecting a final sale.

The first and basic decree in this series v/as the " Fecree of 36 -pril

1938 for the Reporting of Jev/ish-Owned Property" 3/ and v/as followed
by the "Decree of 3 December 1938 Concerning the Utilization ®f Jewish
Rrcperty"

, v/hich inaddition to industrial enterprises included .

agricultural and forest Enterprises, rerl esta-te, and other property,
-article 6 of this states. •

1/ Ibid,, p. 39
a/
p. 18871
3/ Sx. 1647, 1406-PS, DB 103, p. 56

l/ Ex. 1648, 1409-P5, DB 103, "p. 58.
-
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^

"i» Jew

^'irs^ i^egulation -under tha Se^ch

1935) (eGSI I. 1333), maybe

Citizanship of

o^*

Ordered to seH
cntarprlse,

agricultural or forest properties,
n-r other properties within a definite

other real

time; Certain
m,

.

a^riculttLral or forest

j'-fcions '^y

stipulated in the

order.

a rl^ 2 to 4 are to "be aonlied'

ni

^he provisions of

e.ccordingly." 1-/

^^ccording to this decrec^j

the Higher Settlement -authorities are

--^ncies to carry out the program s.t the
designated as the responsiihlo '••B®

vnister of Food and -agriculture is the
h :
"lower levels and the Reich
supervisor of the progrm

ith the authority .to settle all 'question of

•u -hv Order Heoemher 1938, "the Reich Minister
douht.- "^"^ithin the same months <
the procedure to he followed by the

of Food and -^riculturei outli^^^^

Higher Settlement authorities in so far as Jevrish -agricultural Property
. . ^i-Ann to the methods to espedite sales.

is concerned, directed a-ttent
(

He stated that suitable pnop

S.,'

.•rties he sold to licensed settlement coHjsanies

x/^ fhoqe peasants who ha,d surrendered their

Precedence- should he

^

properties to the -*rnied Fortes

under the hgmd Procurement Program. Prices

, •„ n^ricultural prouerties were not to exce®d.'jtiie
to he paid to Jews for their
agric
^
H.

, '
, Tv,
settlement utilization value,
^
, . ,

,

,

event that the rurcha.ser had to pay
>

"-^Tnit to the Reich the differocco hetvreen

a higher a price, he hr.d to remii;
......

,nnd the adequate market value. Where difficul-

settlement utilization value nnu
ties v;ere expected to arise

in the course of a sale the immediate

. .
X «
.
X., ,t£,«3 recommended. It was also recommended that
oppointment of a trustee was
^ .
- -p^ocrint -association he included in the entire
the conpetent R^agional Peasant' -a =

f

proceedings.

3/

IText stop was tha issuanoa of the Order of the Bavarian Hinistry of
Economy department of -.grionlture to the Bavarian Peasant Settlement
Company, dated 16 February 1939, concerning acquisition and utilisation of
Jewish agricultural property, i/
order stated that .purchases and sales
of Jewish real estate by the Bavarian Peasant Settlement Company were
considered settlement proceedings and as su.h were to be carried out in
ac

oordanoe with directives for the new settlement of the German peasantry.

1/ Ibid., p. 59

a/ Ex. 1649, HID-129 73. I® 103, p. 63
^

Ihi d,, p. 54
Ex/ 1651, HID-.13971, IB -xOS, p. 66.
-
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that preference vo.s to "be granted to those peasants who had given up
their land to the -xrined S'orces and that special attention \-7C.q to "be paid
to the establishment of hereditary farms. The question of the surplus
profit and appointment of tru.stees were also dealt with, -,s a result 'of
the decrees listed above, 276 Jewish-owned agriculturaJ. properties com
prising 606;345 hectares pf land were sold in the three G-overnments
Districts of Torthern Bavaria — an ar^a of about one — twentieth of that

of G-ormany as of 1937 .

l./

In his sworn statement of 27 January 1948, Weirner Willi^'^ens,' former

State Secrecary in the Seich Ministry of Food and agriculture and author
of the Order to the Higher Settlement Jiuthorities above referred to, con

firms the participation of the Heich Ministry of Food and ,-griculture -In thx'

r.v

decrees relating to agricultural property were either drc.fted within the

1

Roich Ministry of Food and ^i^'riculture or submitted to the Minister for

approval prior to being published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, Concerning the
order to the ^^igher Settlement -uthoritles discussed herein, V/illikens state

that he signed on behalf of Minister Farre after having notified him of the

order being issued.

£/
•

•f- topical forced sale of agriculturol^property was described to the

•/

Tribunal by the witness Justin SteinhaoUsef. 3/ Hj T.ro,s ordered to offer
"eis propertyf^r sale to the Bavarian Peasant S^btlement Conpany at the

.

/
I

price of

IC.'iOO, fixed by the Higher Settlement -uthority — there w.s

' • • . I"

V,;

no choice in this matter, -^fter deduction of P3i 6,281, 281.80 fop special

tax (part of the billion mauks fine levied on all Jews) ana other inci
dental charges, Steinhaeuser received
at

iHv.?

"a.V

4,118,30 for a property insured

3^,270 in 1931 by the Bavarian State Fire Insurance Institution. The

sum realized from the sale of thig property was placed in a blocked account
at the Brvrrian "Vereinsbank, Bayreuth; and St einha.euser vras informed'that

the account could only be disposed of with the permission of the Finauce
President, Foreign Exchange Offic

in I"'uernberg.

'
hi

2^/ Fx. 1652, FIIl-13973, BB 103, p, 68 (lIOTE: The exact figures for the
entire Feich ai^e not evailabler)

a/S"-. 1650. lTIIX-144-00, Dii 103 , p. 65
3/ E:c, 1645, FIXL.14598. IE- 1C4, Tr. 3388, 359i
-
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Preferences and reT-;r.rds resulting from the sale of Jewish agriculture^

prnperty-Acre so "blatant and prevalent that a decree of 10 June 1S40

ord__'OQ. a re-' examination of the iryanization of the Jevrish property,

l/

Indefense of the above. Parre states that the agricultural property
of the Jews \'^.s sold at a fair price and t^is was particularly trv^ in the
ca.se of the witness Steinhae.user which V7as purcha.sed at the forced sale

a.ccording to its tax value and re-sold at less than this. assessed jKalue.
Parre in effect states tha.t the Jews were not damaged financially, where

as the settlement conpanies v7ore since they bought at the assessed tax
•tv.

value and often scld for lessj tricing the loss resulting from the trans
action. The affidavit of Pr, Mirrow, assistant counsel for Pcoro, sets

. ) •

forth this approach to the effect of the forced saH.e of J wish, agricultural
y

"

'

property as conducted by the Heich Ministry of Pood and -igriculture and
its' subordinat". agencies®

Pot only were the entire proceedings highl^'" irregular but they did in
fact damage the Jewish o^ijners by depriving them of a fair value for the sa''_

of their pronorty^ In his af-fidavit of 5 September 191-8 ^/, the vjitness
Steinhacuser refutes Parre's pos-cion on the question of demage to Jews
as a result of this compulsory sale of agricultural property.

10op_i^tic5iig_to ipws_

Shortly after

the outbreak of the ^^ar, by. secret order of the Eeic}*

Minister of iFood and .agriculture of 1 Pecembor 1939 to the Rogional Pood
offices all Jews were excluded from the speeial retions of meat, fats

and other it<^s in the current retioning period.

5/ ^y another secret order

of 3 January 1940, the above exclusion was extended to the folloxving rationl

period. 4-/ Uniform regulations urn food rations fcr Jews were introduced
by the order of 11 March 1940, und^r which Jews were excluded from the

special food ratiohs«3.d from the prrchc?.se foodstuffs crhfcainable only on
customer lists and as roultry, gams, fish, smoked goods amd skimmed milk.
Ex. 1653, PG-1678, BP 104, n. 1

a/ Pxh. C-404, Firui5654, PP 162
a/ Ex. 1661- PIP-13359, P3 104, -p. 37
4/ Ex. 1662", MG-1651, PB 104, p. 29

a/
' *

1663, HIP - 1-:'^81, IB 104.

31

N

i>^oreovdrj rP-tion co.rds for Jews wore stan^ed with a

••.cross the fact

to guarantee that the holders would not he issued certain foodstuffs and
^-rt>iii.d he restricted to purchasing during the special hours designated

as the shop-ning period for Jews. In the carrying out of Jewish ro.tioning
program hy the I^eich Ministry of Food and -agriculture it was suggested

tha.t cooperation with the party organizations would he of assistance to
the officials operating at the lower levels:
"In cases v/here the Food Offices do not know who is a Jew, they
should contact the Offices of the Police, the Party and the

I'ational. Socialist PeojP^o's Welfare Organizationsr"

1/

Concerning the discrimination in the Jev;ish food ratioring, D^-rre taJces
the position tha.t the Jews benefited hy the food rationing decrees

promulga,ted during his tenure of office since the opera.tion^ of the decrees
protected the

)

Jews hy assuring them of aha.sic food ration and eliminated

the possibility of officials of the Nazi Party interfering v^ith the Jevrs
in obtaining their regula.r food ration, ^he aff"'i'"'t Claussen substantiates

this theory and is in acc >rd with Parre that the Jews benefited by the
legislation of the Peich Mj^nistry of Food a.nd ^x^riculture.

In reviewing the decrees promulgated by the Reich Ministry of Food
and -agriculture during the •••'ar yof rs it becomes evident that the above
orders originally introduced against the Jews v;ere not too severe and
in fact did allov; for the issuance of sufficient food liO the Jevjs to carry

on their daily activities, ^nt it is also evident th-i'-t these Orarly orders
led to more drastic cuts in the Jewish food rationing which eventually

T

did deny to the Je^s basic foodstuffs such as meat, fats and oggs roquifad
for their daily sustenance.

R~iS"hTLd;i{up_rii

Parre stated that there was no question in October 1939 as to who

originp-.ted and developed the Resettlement Program both in the SS and the
Reich Ministry of Food and -.griculture. In the words of Parre:

1/ Fx, 1661, FI]>a3359, PB lO-i, p. 38

-
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" ^ ^ , oY^jrylDody in &dri3cny knovTS'
the se dg creating the
iiecessary orgaJiizationcd conditions in the SS for this ta.sk

go "hack to my seven years of devoted "'-rork as Chief of the Baciand Settlement Main Office. ^Jithout this work on my nart. the

SS would today not even he in a position to put the whole
nrohlem

for discussion.

«

'If

Concerning the preparations made and completed vdthin the Hoich lii-^istry
of Food and -jgricul ture "by October of 19^9 Tarre also s'atedi

"Bound up with the settlement of the 5k.stern territories is
the qudstion of possible reparations for da.mage to Od^'man
-erOYiorty occvasioned by the ipolish agrarian reform, -i-'ealing
v/ith this difficult nroblem presup-ooses; nowoverj an exten
sive knowledge of the Polish agrarian legislation and settle
ment activities, -j^-1 these a.re ta-sks for which the necessaxy

•olanning and nreliminary work were done care"ully a long time

ago in ray Ministry in close cooperation with the Heich^Poud
Bstatoj and for i-'hich, besides the official's of my Ministry^I
have a.t my disposal my settlement and land ,economy -• ithorities

/•

with their trained ..:;aff of officials; likewise the settlement
companies subordinated to me. These forces i could put in
Operation at short notice-" ^

iifter receiving word tha.t the task of resettling within Occupied
Poland vrere to'be entrusted to Hiimnler o,nd the SS and that already nroli-

minaxy drafts bad been drawn to oover the same, Paxre began his campaign
to h<'.ve the resettlement program entrusted to him, preferably in whole
and at leC-st in part, "s a result of this campaign in w'ich a series of
letters to the Reich Leader SS were dispatched and a number of conferences

held, Parre achieved his purpose and he and the settlement agencies sub^
ordinated to him were given Jurisdiction for the new seitloraent for Ojrnan

peasantry in the occurpied Sastern territories. This grcvnt of authority
was set forth in .xticle 3 of the Edict of the xiehrer on the Strer-gthoning
' of G-ormanism, Since the origin£a draf-; of the edict did not include even

a reference to Pn.rre and his agencies and had in effect removed him from
the entire program, Darre w^.s c rp-blled to battle for th ; privilege of

particpating in tha Resettlement Program to be conducted in the Last. Had
Larre not exerted himself so he would not hive been given any Jurisdiction
in the program, -*s Larre stated;
"I eiipha.size "tbat without this concession, obtained by me
ofter a battle lastingt.-ro hours, to concede at least tho

carrying out of the new settlement of G-erman pee.sreitry to
my department, I should not even h-ve the right today to
utilise the experienced machinery of ray Ministry for the
settlement unless I earned the good will of the Reich Leader

and he permitted me to settle as a token of his special favor. ^

Ij Ex, 1654, 110-1759, LB 104, p. 6
^ Ibid., p,5

3/ I-bid,, p. 11
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In roviewing tha activitios of thd Hoich Oommissar for tho Sbrongthd^.
ing of Crarmanism, it is to "be noted that vrhile Darre and his sottlemont
- orga^L.izatiotis played a rather jrdnor role, yet the nature of their nork:
wo.s of sufficient Inroortance to make a definir-e contrioution to this

program and thus to implicate the Reich Ministry for Jood and —gricuLtur^-;
Reich Food listate and Settlement Gcmpanies subordinate to Darro in the
criminal a.cLs .voinm.itted in the name of re--G'ermaniz;vuioiif Da.rro considered
?he new settlement of Serrnam pea-santry to "be of outstanding importance

axd offered as proof of the same, the aim of the work which was "tc make
the nev/ly acquired Rhstorn provinces the most G-crmaiiic peasant proj"lnces

of the Reich," 1/ -iccording to ..o-ticle HI, paragraph 1 of the ndict,

%

Darro was commis-ioned with the carrying out of the new settlement of

the O-ermcoi peasantry, receiving his general instruerions from the Reich
Loader SS, and in turn hn.ving the intermediate and lower settlement

agencies and settlement companies directly responsible to him and bound
by his orders.

Zj

Pursuant to Section 3 of the decree of 12 February 194C S/ on the
Public Management of the -^iculturcJ. and Forest nnterprisos and-rroper-

^

ties in the Incorporated Eastern Territories"
•"For the carrying out of the poblic management, the Reich
Minister of Food and -agriculture will appoint an .^ministrar-

tor G-eneral, who vnll be bound by his directives," 1/
*

the Reich Minister of Food ana agriculture, by order of f3 Februany 19-10

set up the "Eastern Germany Land Management Company Lth" , and appointed
A

it as Ldministratur Genera^.,

Ij

pjg

5/ The comnany began its

ISLS, FG-,9o7. P3 72--3, p, -19 & JB 104, p, 14

a/ L_t, 165-4, FC^1759, 1)3 104, p. 14
a/ Sr., 1656, hG..2n50r 33 104, p. 17 (over)
4/ Section 1 of above decree states: "HI agricultural and forest ente:
prises and prorjerty situated in the incornora.ted Eastern territories
and which, on 1 September 191^9 were not In the nossession of ethnic

Gurmans, will be placed undwi public management,, ^TMs a so ^polios to

such enterprises arid uroperties wlich are requisitioned by the Reich
Commissar for the Strengthening of Germa.nism, To the fores ento^riser
and propertivis do nob belong such forest enterprises and properties fo::
which the Reich Forest Mf-.stor and the Reich Minister of -ood and

-•agriculture issue other provisions.

"Subject to p:fblic management are also the implements aud croips, as wee

as all rights, clalras, sha/res and interests of every kind wnich R.,rve
or belong to the enterprise or property,"

5/ Fx. 1657. FG->2053. 33 lOdj p, 20,
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activities -prior to 34

d..-ci'o.;

1940c Inforrr!o.tion concurring tlio 0.1)070

a-ppointnont of the Oorapan:,'- was puhlished in the Heich Minister;

3pJ,.lot.-.n of bhe -igricnj.turol ..^duinistration., 1./ This 3-ollotin ai.so dis
closed the'extent of the organisation "by lisijin^c the c.ddressos 'jf the

headquarters end ;Lts eight "branch offices,, estahlished i-c carry out this
V-'orkt,

111 renJ.y to bhe oharg- tha.t he po.rticipo-ted in the G- T-manization progri
as conducted in the Ix:corporated Sa-stern Territories, Tarre strhi... L tliat

he V'.d no uarticiprtion in Hfnniler's criminal acbi-vitlos e.nd was onl./
concerned with -nroviding the farmers with equipment and sigoulios iiv:.ces*^"

scry to inorove the Pjiish agricultural properbies- ^arrcs position is
thai his agency'-- the .lo.sb G-erman lo.nd Hc .nagement Gom,-•.nj'", actju as a

trustee only and as such accual'y -crotected the propei-ty of the roles^
Polish agricultural property vra.s exploited in order to increa.se

the G-crman food su-nnly,. It v/as with this "orirpose in mindth.at all of the
equipment and farm ou-o-clie s wore furnished to the last carman Laud
Management Coirpany. Fc consideration was given to the right f>il o-^-mers
of the vroperties. —t the termination ef hostilities

these prcp-..rtios

vrore to "be offend to G-^rm^ms or ethn"c Germans who were qualifi-^d to

Own a farrni, In reviewing the activities of the last Gorman Land hiauatgo--

mont OoTiT-.any it is clear that its practices were carried out in violation
of intorna.tional iaw-

1/ S::c. •i6!58, FHi-ldSOS, LQ 104, p, 31
a/ "Ex. 1659, FIDl-i607, L3 lO-i, p, 3S
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Pertinent Paragraphs uf the indictment
52, 55, and 57,

JUT liXCiSPTS:

"The methods employed to e:^Dloit the resources of the occupied territories
to the full varied from co^mtTy to country^

In some of the occupied coun

tries in the :3a3t and the V7est, ohis e:cploitation was carried out within
the framework of ohe existing economic structure , . a"
IMT Judgment, Volume I, Page 239

"As a consequence of this order, agricultural productiv. ra\r materials
nedded hy G-erman factories, maci^.ne tools, transportation equipment,

other finished products, and even foreign securities and holdings of
foreign exchange wore all requisitioned and sent to Germany,, Those re
sources v;ere requisitioned in a manner out of all proportion to the
economic resources of those countries, and resulted in femine, inflation,
and an active "black market » . »"

IhT Judgment, Volcns I, Page 240

"In many of the occuniod countries of the IBast and the Vi'est, the

authorities maintained the pretense cf paying for all the property vjhich

they seised: This elahorate pretense of payment merely disguised the
fact that the goods sent to Germany from thes^ occupied countries were
paid for "by the occupied countries th>--inEe].ves, either "by the device of
fv

excessive occupation costs or "by forced loans in return for a credit
"balance on a "clearing account" vrhich was an account merely in name.,
"In most of the occupied countries of the Sast even this pretense of
legality was not maintained^ economic oicploitatioh "became; deli'boraoe
plunderg This Toolicy v/as first put into effect in the administration of
the Government General in Poland. The main esploitation of the raw ma^
terials in the East vras centered on agricultural products and very large
amounts of food were shipucd from the Government General to Gorman;^''.
"The evidence of the vrldespread starvation among the Polish people in the
Government General indicates the ruthiossnoss and severity with vrhich the
policy of exploitation vras carried out,"

im Judgment, Volume I, Pages 240-241
"The economic demands made on the General Government were far in excess

of the needs of the ariiiy of occupation, and vrcro out of all proportion
to the resources of the country^. The food raised in Poland was shipped
to CJerinany on such a wide scale that the rations of the population of
the occupied territories wore reduced to the starvation level, and epi—
domicc wore widospreadj Some steps were tekcn to provide for the feed
ing of the agricultural workers vrho v/ere used to raise the crops, tut
the roquiroments of the rest of the population vjere disregarded, ,
IwT Judgment, Volume I, Pago 297
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Judicial notice of tho II-iT Judgment, concerning Spoliation of Agri

cultural Products and tho effect of this program upon tho inhabitants of
the occupied o-rcas having "been tohen, the Prosecution introduced into

evidence tho official records and statistics of the Reich Ministry of
Rood and Agriculture to prove the.t part of tho foodstuffs a"bovo roferred
to vrero imported into the Reich during Darrens tenure of office, tha.t
is, "betv/een 1 September 1939 and 12 May 1942. 1/
iTho explanation of the procedure followed in the normal operation
of a request for foodstuffs by means of quotas established by the Reich
Ministry of Rood and Agriculture is outlined in tho testimony/ of the

witness nurt Dietrich and tTaltor Rflaunbeun, referred to below, to
gether with the identity of tho offices and persons, involved,
T'estinon^^ of the witness Ministerial Rat Dr. Kurt Dietrich,

shovrs

that the i-.inistry of Ro^od and Agriculture and in particular its Division
II was concerned with and had the responsibility for feeding the (Jernan
people. .The Ministry through Division II determined the amount of food
stuffs to be it^orted into the Reich,

Testimony also shows that wliilc

the Ministry of Rood and Agriculturo in general did not participate in
the administration of tho occupied territories directly, it did have
contact with the fornor members of the Ministry and the Reich Rood

Estate who v/ero assigned to tho military and civilian staffs as food

and agricultural exports in tho administration of the occupied torritorios, 3y virtue of their positions ^-Tithin the occupied territories ,
those experts were able to dcternino tho foodstuffs available vMthin

a given area and to rocomnend the amount v/hich should be shipped to the
ivl,;:.

Reich,

In addition we have the explanation of the dual capacity in

A;

which State Secretary Dadkc acted as State Secretary in the Ministry of

,Rood and Agriculture and Chief of the Business Group Rood In tho Rour

ij Ex. 3548, IIG-1053, D3 105, p.3
2/ Official Transcript in Cese Ko. 11

42o5-66-68-69 f'nd 70
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Year Plan —a position ho occupied "by virtue of his duties as State
Secretary,

iJ

.

'

•

Por "both functions Backs required the me-chinery and aid of

the personnel of Division II of the Ministry —he worked through this
division of the Ministry while using the authority of the Pour Year

Plau to accori^plish the vrapress purposes of Division II of tho ministry
and thus in effect vras ahlo to give jurisdiction to the Reich I'linistry
of Pood and .-igriciLLture in areas where it would not othorvriso "be
2/
conroeteht to act.

(Testiinony of the witness ''alter Pflaur."baun, Chief of the Reich
Office for Aninip.ls and Animal Products, shows that all foodstuffs and

other agricultural products coming into the Reich wore chP-nnoled throu^
•

the Reich Offices. There vras no other way for imported or requisitioned
foodstuffs to enter the Reich,

pflpuifoeun's tostinony f^.lso shovrs tnat

the Reich Ministry of Pood and Agriculture informed tho Reich Offices
as to the amount of foodstuffs scheduled to arrive at the Reich border.

In addition Pflaunbau: also stated that the question of distribution

vras decided by Division II of the Ministry and that the Reich Offices
vrcre instructed to turn over the foodstuffs to the R'-"!icn jjood —state

(subordina.te to the Reich Ministry of"Pood and Agriculture fron tho

beginning of the war by order of Darre) for distribution vrithin the
Reich,

B2'" decree of 10 January 1940, signed by Darre, the Reich jiood
Pstate taw and the decrees to carry it out vrore introduced in the

Incorporated Eastern territories.

4/

All foodstuffs in the nevrly

.annexed territories cano under tho control of Darre in the sane

na-nnor as all foodstuffs were regul.^ted and controlled by him since
1935 vrithiii the old Reichi

l/ Official transcript in Opso Kg, 11, 4S66
g! Ibid
^ Transcript 487S—73—74 and 75

3:c, 2547"^, ]!III^14553, DB 105, p. 1

-
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Statement of Defense

Eenlying to the charges of the Prosecution that the progrrp of spolio.tion existed during Darrens tenure of office, the Defense offered the

"Pigures on the German h"ar Pood Econonj-" to prove that a Reich foodstuffs

spoliation program never existed either during the early years of the v.-ar
under Darre or thereafter.

To justify the removal of foodstuffs from the occupied and incorporat
ed territories, the Defense presented an affidavit "by Hans Joachin Rxecke ,
former- State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of ^'ood and Agriculture.

Herein he explains for the most important foodstuffs, hread-grain, fats,

neat, potatoes end sugar the deliveries of the occupied territories and
the suhsidios granted to then. He then states the legitinc.te consurrotion
of the Armed Porccs in the, occupied territories, computes the deliveries

Of the Reich to Austria and the Sudetenland, and shovis that the foreign

vrorkers and the prisoners of war were actu'lly naints-ined fron Gorman food
supplies. Pinally, he concludes that the German population did not hy
any means live at the expense of the occupied torritorios, or in other
\

v/ords» there was no food spoliation.

prp_se_cuti^on' ^ ^eply_ to_ihove__

Control Connoll Lo.w No. 10, designating as criminal the plunder of

pu-blio or private property, gives effect to Article 52 of the Hague

Convention (Ho. IV of Gotoher 1907, "Lav; and Customs of Har on Land")
which states:

"Requisitions in kind and services shall not he demanded fron

nunLipalitles or inhabitants except for the needs pf_tho_arn5r

S oooStiL. They shall he in proportion to the resources

ofAhelsountry, and of such a nature as not to involve the in.tehitants in the ohligation of taking part in military opera
tion aga.inst their ovm country.

"Such roquisltiona and services shall o^y he demndod on the

authority of the oomandar in the locality occupied.

ij Sx,. 150, DB IT IS
-
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"Contri'butions in kind shall as far as possibly "be paid for in cash;

if not, a receipt shall be given and the •)aynent of the nnoiint due
shall be nade as soon as possible,"
Gernany, a signo-tory to the Hague Convention, violated Article 53
in every country inv^.ded a,nd occupied, often by brutal force, nore often

without, since the methods of payment (described in the IHT Judgment)
erroloyed by theR©ioh agencies attained their goal v;ithout having to resort
to force.

It is not a valid defense to the charge of spoliation to shov; that
foodstuffs wore moved from one occupied country to another for the pur
pose of covering a shortage in a particular area.

Basically, the offense

is the ronoval of foodstuffs above and beyond the needs of the occupying
army in that country. The question as to whether or not the foodstuffs
requisitioned vrere in proportion to the resources of the country concerns
only the amounts required to feed the occupying array stationed in that
country and not the troops stationed in other countries.

The Defense argaes that Germany, as the cjcupying power, assuraed an
obligation to the countries occupied P.nd hence v;hero there was a shortage
of food, Germany had no alternative but to cover that shortage by shipping

food from a relatively surplus area so that finally all might be supplied*
To begin with, Germany vras nevc.r an exporter of foods and none of the
occupied countries fornerly depended upon Germany for their food supply.
Had Belgium, ITorvjay, tho Hothcrlands, Austria and Czechoslovakia not been
invaded they would have provided for their own feeding and vrould not have
needed Germany's assistance,

Poland serves as an example of how Gernanj'- perfected her policy of
spoliation in foodstuffs. By Bdict of the Fuehrer, 8 October 1939, a
large section of western Poland v/as incorporated into the Reich in viola

tion of intornn-tlonal law.

This area of approximately 93,000 square

kilometers, in addition to the foriier Prussian provinces of 'Test Prussia

(including Danzig) and Poscn and Pastern Upper Silesia,included sections
of the former govorni-ient districts of Warsaw, Lodz and Krakow, totalling
approximately 46,000 square kilora>.:ters or roughly one-half of the nevdy

-
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incorporated territory,

1/

With, the exception of Eastern "Upper Silesia,

the new territory produced large food snrplusses which vrcre utilized for
the "benefit of the Reich.

Thousands of Poles and Jews were driven from

the Incorporated Eastern Territories into that renaining pert of Poland
occupied "by G-ernany and referred to as the Governnent General,

.rilthou^

this le-tter area was greatly ovorcrovrded, it was still cor:5)cllcd to
supply foodstuffs for the Gernan v/ar effort.

As proof of the alleged fact that there was no spoliation of food^
stuffs in either the incorpora-ted or occupied territories, affiant Riocke

2/
used the ta'bles of the "Figaros on the Gernan War Food Econoiiy"

to

neke up "bread-grain halo-nces, fat "balances, neat "balances, potato "balances
and sugar "balances for the years 1939-40 to 1943-44.

A very fp.vora"ble

result is achieved by deducting the subsidies or exports, respectively,
to incorporated, occupied and friendly territories, deducting next the
subsidies to Austria and the Sudetenlsnd and finally the consumption of

the Arned Forces. As already pointed out, the prosecution rejects that
V

the transfer of foodstuffs from one occupied country or territory to

another, even in the forn of so-cr.llcd food br.lances, is peruissible
under international law.

It is a fallacy to include in each table su"b-

sidies to Austria and the Sudetenland which were estine.ted by Riecke

wheree.s the b?sic food balances in Exh. 2548 vrore made for Gred-ter

Gernany (Territory as of 1 September 1939).
The food b^"lances nr.do up by affiant Kiecke (appendices 1 to 25 to
his affidavit) have been adjusted by the prosecution in accudance \/ith

the above objections, but only for the years 1939/40, 1940/41 and 1941/42
in which Parre was in office.^cf. Appendix to this Brief),
An error is evident in the potato balances where the conputcd tables

of the Defense include, erroneously, the consumption of the Vrehrnacht.
Table IG 1 lists under quantities available. "Inports of Wohrmacht from
occupied territories". The sane ouantities are listed under consumption

1/ Ex, C-415, FII>-15618, DB 162
2/ Ex» 2548, NG - 1053, DB 105
-
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of the '•Jehrma.cht

fron the occupied territories,

'.'ehrnacht consu-nption

v-fithin the Reich is to "be supplied fron donestic sources and hence the
figaires listed for consunption of the V/ehrmacht vrithin the Reich are
not to he considered.

Ror this reason, no deduction for the Wehrnacht

consuxrotion should he nade in the respective tables,

^uijiiar^. of_t he JBrend-(jrai_n_Balance^
Reich Surplus

Reich Subsidy

1939/40

1940/41

44,000 t

1941/43

878,000 t

913,000 t
Sunniary o.f_the_FatJBalan_ce£
Reich Surolus

1939/40
1940/41

Reich Subsidy
8,000 t

29,700 t

1941/43

6,300 t
29,700 t

14,200 t

14^200 t
15,500 t

^unn^^y of^thejleat Balances
•>

Reich Surplus

1939/40

135,300 t

1940/41

83,100 t

1941/43

_40,80g t

Reich Subsidy

259,200 t

'-V-

'•*

9 >*fv »•,»

•WMy-etf'y

&iiinnar^ of_the^ot^tc_ 3?4arLC£S__
P.eich Surplus

1939/40

330,000 t

1940/41

304,000 t

1941/43

1,529,000 t

Heich Su"b3idy

3,163,000 t

&amiary of__the_Sugar Bglances,
Reich Surplus

1939/40

253,500 t

1940/41

379,000 t

1941/42

195,000 t

Reich Subsidy

727,500 t

The sumraaries of the defense, which include the years 1942/43 a.nd

1943/44, shew the following result;

Bread-grain balances
Rat balances

Surplus

Subsidy

458,000 t

~

-

Keat balances

339,800 t

27,300 t

Potato balances

-

-

Sugar balances

1,974,000 t

390,-400 t

In order to deternine the relation between surplusses and subsidies,

the defense converts the above balances into calories in accordance with
the following caloric values:

100 gre-ins of bread-grain

300 calories

100 grams of fat

800 calories

100 grams of neat

135 calories

100 grams of potatoes

80 calories

100 grams of sugar

'^OO calories

and comes to the result that the caloric value of the surplusses, namely

3,305 billion calories is about the same as tha.t of the subsidies, namely

-
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3,497 "billion calories. Therefore, at least according to the defense,
there \-re.s no food spoliation, vrhatsoever.

Other irregiaarities noted ';rere (l) the deduction of auantitios

consuned

the foreign workers and prisoners of

on the "basis that

they were fed fron Oernan supplies, (S) foreign workers and priscncrs of
war received sonewhat higher ration than the G-ernan nornal ccnsuner, and

(3) a large percentage of the foreign workers and prisoners cf vjar rcceiv-ed supplementary rations as heavy workers,

After a careful stud;."- of the defense offered tc the charge of

spoliation the Prosecution is not convinced that there wag no prcgron

of spoliation in foodstuffs, nor is it convinced that the Reich actually
suhsidized the occupied countries vn th domestically produced foodstuffs.
Since su"bstantial new evidence lias not "been introduced to rebut the
findings of the IKT as set forth in this brief, the Judgment of. the
IL'IT stands,

. •
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Fertinant po.ra.grr^iis of the Indictment!
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"'xbe policy of tho German occupfttion euthorities was in fla^ant

•violation of the terms of this conyintion.

Some idop. of this

poj.icy may "be gathered from the strtomcnt made "by Hitler in p.
spooeh on 9 Novemher 1941?

"

.

'

i''

"The territory which now works for us conteins more
than S50,000,000 men, "but tho territory which works

indirectly for us includes novr more th?n 350,000,000.
In this measure in which i^b concerns Gorman terri
tory, ^tho domain vdiich v^e have t^ken under our admin
istration, it is not doubtful that we shall succeed
in harnessing the very last man to thus work."

"The P-ctual results achieved were not so com-oiete as this, hut t^e

fermcn occupation authorities did succeed in for-ing mPny'cf the"

inhabitants of the occupied territories to work for the Geiman wax

effort, and in deporting at least 5,000,000 persons to GermP-ny to
serve German industrv and

culture.

"In the earj^ stages of the war, manpower in the occupied terri—
torioa, v/a.s unier the control of various occupation authorities,
and tne procedure varied from country to country.

In all the

occupied territories conpulsory labor service v^as prorptly
instituted. Inhabitants of the occupied ceuntrlos v;ere con
scripted and con^elled to work in local occupations, to PBsist
the Gorman war econociy. In many cases they were forced to v7ork
on Gorman fortifications and militrr;.'- installations. As local
or raw materials and local industrial cspa.city became

inaxLcqiiato to meet the German req.uiromGnts, the system of de
porting laborers to Germai^r was put into force. .
BiT Judgment, ITolume I, pages 243-244

. .In the case of Polns employed on farms in Germany, the em-

ployors^were given authority to inflict corporal punishment and

were^ ordered, if possible, to house them in stables, not in their
own nomos. Thoy were subject to constant supei-^islon by the
Gestapo and tho 30, and if they atten-pted to leave their -^obs thev
were sent to correction carjjs or concentrrtion ca-rrps. .
II2r Judgment, Yolume I, Page 246

"Frank introu,uced tho deportation of slave laborers to Germany in
the very early stages of his administrati on.

On 25 Janua-n-- 1940

he inuicctea his intention of deporting 1 million laborers to Gormany, suggesting on 10 May 1940 the use of police raids to meet

tliis quota.. On 18 August 1943 Frank reported that he had already
supplied 800,000 workers for the Heich, and ex-oected to be able
to supply 140,000 more before the end of the year,"
IMY Judgment, Tolurae I, Page 897
-
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Dcportr-tion of foreign civiliojis for v;ork in aermnny h.-d its

•beginning in Polrnd. These workers wore forcibly doportod in response
to domnnds made "by German Agriculture nnd in particular "by Hoich Minister

I3arrG, TJpon nrrivnl in Germany those Polos were assigned to agriculture
and distrihutod throughout the Hoich in accordance with the noods of the

peasantry and woro then suhjoct to Police and SS-rogulations governing
their every activity.

Pac_t_s ^n_Por_oi_gn_l'(orkor_s_in Gorra_£n__Agr^cul_^uro
There v;a.s an acute shortago of agricultural v/orkors at the out- '
'

u

roak of the wan, — whether this v/as the continuation of an •evor-pre-sont

condition within German agriculture or whether it was caused "by drafting
into the Wohrmacht thousands of agricultural worl^n.rs is not iii^ortant.
What is inportant is Darrens recognition of this worker shortage '-nd his
immediate- attoirpts to procure additional workrirs hy requesting that a
sufficient number of Polos be secured to corapensate for the shortage of
Germans. Darro prov-.d himself to
a. vigorous compaigner in his quest

for sufficient fa-m workers for the Gorman agriculture, presenting his
dora-nds to the (l) Hoich Ministry of Labor, (S) the Gvinoral Counsol of
• hr^/

the. Pour Year Plan and (3) Dr. Pr? nk, in his capa.city as Governor Gon4/

oral of Poland.

It was during the courso of prosonting the above re

quests for agricultural workers that the possibility of employing force

to obtain the required number was first discussed.

Tho initial decision

wa.g that forco should be adopted as a last resort, and v:as to bo om-

ployed in tho event that ot3inr methods failed.i/ This was particularly

E3di. 2521, H&-1204, DB 106, p. 1

^
^

Pxh. 1043, HG- 453, DB 106, p. 2
Sell. 2522, BG-1162, DB 106, p. 8
2527, PS-2233, DB 106, p.24

pj Ibid

-
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true in the caso of tho ono million Polos roquostod of Pr-*mk in his

p^^-city ns Govornor'Gon Tnl of Pol^.nd. "In tho origino.l conforonco on this
spocinl Polish roquost, tho npplicotion of forco

dcscribvid os o.-dos-

sihiiity sure of producing o. roquirod numhor of v/orkors hut one thot
should not ho rosortod to' until other mothods h'"'d hoon triod first — such

as tho v^ithholding of cortoin honofits custo.T.r.rily granted to tho

u
workers.

At tho oxpirotion of ahout two months ^nd whon rll othor mothods
had frOilod to produco tho roquirod numhor of workers for tho Soich, tho
application of forco was docidod upon as tho only way to moot the quota

2/
pstahlishod hy tho Roich Ministry of Pood and Agriculture:

tho middle of ^ril 1940, con^ulsory deportation of
lahorors to Germany h^d hoon ordered in the General

Government

"5/

All of the ahovo is corrohoratod hy tho testimony of tho witness

Htarraoning;

roquests v;oro made through the regul'^r channels of tho Reich

Lahor Ministry; special conft.^renccs wore held with Governor General Prankin order to oxoodite tho receipt of Polish workers; possihlo use of forco
was discussed; certain forms of pressure were applied, coirpulsory la.hor
SQjTvico was in'^uguratod in Govornment General of Poland; demands v/oro

constantly mad.o hy the Reich Ministry of Pood a^d Agriculture; as of

January 194S tho nurahor of Polos th't had arrived within the Roich and
assignod to Gorman a.griculturo wa.s 742,000; demands of tho Roich Ministry
•'X

of Pood and Agriculture, wore never fully satisfied ••^nd ropoatod roquosts
for tho fulfillment of the worker quota wore mado up to a.nd after 12 Hay
4
1942.

Another source of agricultural workers was created and dov lopod

with tho operation of tho Rosottlemont Progrnra in Poland, As a result
of tho sottlcmont of ethnic Germans within Poland, ovictod Polieh farraors

and their families wore shipped to Gormrny as agricultural workers ™ somo

\J Ibid., p. 28

S/ Ihid., p. 29 and p. 30
3/ IMT, p. 244
^ Tt. 4234-4265
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WGro sent directly while others wnro chp.niiolGd through tho crinps cs-

tahlishcd "by tho Roich Coimnissionor for tho Strcngthoning of Gormauism,

u

v/horohy thoy wont first to the Govornniont General and then to tho Roich.
Onco the'Polish workers arrived within tho Hoich thoy wore nuh--

jGctod to a sorios of regulations including tho decree of the RoichS'fucEcer-SS and the Chief of the German Police and the decree of tho
2/

HSIiAp.

As a result of these docreos puhlishod in the official hullotin

of the Reich Pood Estate, Gorman workers of Polish nationality wore de

nied practically oil of their freedom and generally treated as suh-human
"beings.

Darro not only had knowledge of this prograin "but went on

record a,s fa.voring it for the single roa,son tha.t it was in a.ccorda,nco

with tho r<acial precepts and standards of Ha.tional Socialism, The lot
of tho Ea,storn worker could have boon irr^rovod by tho efforts of Ilarre,
but such efforts woro not forthcoming.

Da-rre's ^fons_G ^n_Porped Wo^k0_r^

'According to Earre he was never informed about 'vforkers being de
ported from Poland for assignment to the German agriculture. He never
considered that there might be any difficulties encountered in getting

any number of seasoned workers from Po3,and because thcjy had been so
.5/

ancious to come to Germany in tho pro—war years.

Tho reasou given for

his not being concGrnod with the question of forced VJorkera was that this

typo of labor conld net fit into the German agricultura-1 system. Ho also
stated thnt ho was not informed about any confarenco with Governor Gen

eral Pra.n; , oithor a.t the latter^s private or official rosidonco, attended

by roprosontativos of the Ministry and the Roich Pood Estate - a.ny tos1!

tiraony to tho contrary ia In crrer nor did ho have any knovdedgo of

ij Exh, 2525, HGw-1655, PS 106, p.. 20
^ Exla. 2532, HG-1412, EE 106, p. 49
Exh.. 2535, HG-1027, EE 106, p. 58
Exh. 2539, RIE-14B54, EB 106, p. 83
Exh. 2536, HG-1445, ps 106, p. 61

3/ Exh. 2540, EC-68, EE 106, p. 85

^

Exh. 2533, EG-1144, EB 106, p. 52

bj Tr. 19007

e>J Tr. 19013
7/ Tr. 19014 and 19015
-
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requests made by the Group Pood of the Pour Toor

As a matter of

fact he w.as to keep clear of all Polish questions by direction of Hitler
^nd would not went to arouso Hitler's suspicions th'^t ho was indirectly

1/

circumventing en official prohibition.

In attitudo, the Hoich Minister

for Pood and Agriculture was not justified in carrying out direct ncgoti;
tions with Pronk.

^ . . Ihorc was some question of a mri:powor shorte^o during the spring

Of 1940 and it was nocossary to know wh'-^t labor would bo available for

|hG harvest ospocially sinco the .vitad war time foods^oquirod sufficient
hand labor, which in turn demanded increased manpov;Gr. But this proolom
was solved by the arrival of largo numbers of French PW's and the omergoncy

sltu-^tion wr.s thus tormlnutod. iO-l ngriculturrO. workors worn woll tror.tod
in Gcrnnny.m fnct D.urro is of tho opinion that thoy fared hotter in Gormany than they would have in their native country.
S'^^cts, Is^tamished bv_Pro£ecution

I

Tho Prosocutionc / prorod (l) Polos woro roguoetod ,zy(s) tho question
of force was discussod, (s) Polos did axrive in Gorman3^ and (d) thoy
wore the same Pol:;s that had been deported by force from Poland in oidcr
to rarko available agricultural workers for Gijrrnan;;/.

Dr.rrc ntoits thot ns Hoich Minister of Poodg-nd Agriou^turo it
*

WOS his duty to koop -griculturnl production moving in Gormrny. In tho
course of fulfilling this duty it hoceme noCossej-y to hring rgrioultur,.l
workors to Gormnr^ end to epply force in ohteining tho numhor required to

moot Gormes^'s production schod.ae. The need for eddltionnl o^-riculturel
1/ Tr.

19015

2j Tr.

19016

3/ Tr.

19009

^ Tr.

19012
19030

6/ Pxh.
YJ Bxh.

D Erdi.

Exh.
Exh.

9/ Tr.

2523,
C-43,

•a^v,a
HB 106

163 167, 185 and 187 - 189,
m trpii
''

and 19036 - Barrn Sxhs. lo3, i-o'j

NG-140B,

mn~15581, 1)B 165--A, p.

C-406 ,hll>-15320
C-40V ,HIB-15345

to i!n:B"l5344

C-408 ,HID-15631
19008

to mD-15633

-
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^r. 15311

f '.i

workors wr^ never in fact met, othorv/ise the requests m^do "by H^r-

U

moning of the Iloich Ministry would never hf^vo "been Buhmitted.

In reply

to Darro^s statement that forced laborers could not work in tho Gernrn

rigricultura^l oconojry

it is sufficient to rofer to the number of pWs

assigned to C-orraan Agriculture — they performed their duties under
armed guard.

-

On the question of tho Prenk conforonco, Darro had to know a,ll

about it ——prior arrr.ngements and result.

Harraening roprocontod the

.Ministry and Bchrnns was^tho Deputy Poaaant Loader, they sinply did not
prrangc this on their own.

Darro and Frank being of equal ranK vioro the

proper persons to arrange this conferoncQ '"nd since they had known each
other from the early days of Munich it can bo undorstood that Da-rro
would turn to Frank for assistance in an Graorgoncy situation ospocially

BO bocausG Darre did not want to take a.ny official action in rola-tion to
f

Pola^nd. This latter fact may well osplnln tho absonco of Da-rro and tho

presonco of his roprosentativos — ho may again bo covoring himself
from possible criticism.

Concerning tho question of troatmont of the foreign workers (vrhich
in itself is incidental to tho iiiporta.tion of tho worker), Darro ox•nlains his position as ono boing cXovor onough not to take any stand
3/

in tho controversy.

.

As stated above, ho certainly never entered any

objection on the record as to this matter of harsh troatmont.
In roviovjing the ovidonco submitted by tho defense there is cor

tainly no novr evidonco to rebut the finding of the IMT but on the conevidence as- a v/hole substantiatos tho Judgment of tho Il€! on
tho forced doportatinn of Polos for v/ork in Gormr-n ngriculturo.

1/ TT. 19028

2/ Tr. 19013
^ Tr. 19029

~
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Till

pertinent para^r^ha of Indictment j
73 and 75

ProBBcution Document Books 95 and 101 contain the exhibits per

tainlng to the above paragraphs of the Indictment,

SS activities of Defendant Darre included ser^ce as Chief of
the Race and Settloraent Main Office from 1931 to 1938 and memher of

the personal staff of Reich Leader-SS from 12 Septeraher 1938 to 21 Jan-

uary 1945^ Darre attained the rank of SS-Ohergruppenfuehrer.
Prom 1933 to

1942i Darre was the Reich Leader of the Reich

Office for Agrarian Policy of the HSDAP.
Defense jfco__Me^mhership i.n__Criminal Or^anizajtipn^

Darro stated (l) that he resigned from the S3 at the outhreals:

I

of the war and at the latest during October 1939, and (2) that the

A,

Reich Office for Agrarian Policy of the HSD^ was dissolved after the

assumption to power in 1933 and thoroaftor fulfilled no practical
~ 6/
purpose.

Prp.sGcution'^ Reply.

Whf-tovor Darro's Bontimonts toward Simmlor^may liap hecn ho did
4-Virv cjc
dtirins 193B or 1939 hoca,uso this
not in fact resign from tho bb either auxins.

1/ Dxh. 995, XnD-12313. DB 101, p. 1
ETh

998

NID-12975, DB 101, p.

8

Exh

932 NID-12340, DB 117,. p. 39 (^o 1©

Exh! 973^ NID-X2674, IB 117, p- 32 (also ^ xOl. p. 12)

995.: HII.-12213.
^Zj IS:
Bxh. 2654,
4728, ^ 101,
^5, .p.
p. 331 (p-agroph 3
Exh. 2653, NG- 4739, DB

P-

P-

E>di. 2655, PS- 2473, DB 95, p.

^

Tr, 19094

^ Tr. 19062

6j Tr, 19056 and 19061

7j Tr. 18897 and 19049

^ Tr. 19050 and 19055
~

''
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was not to "bo toXcratod Xy Hitlor.

official files of tho SS con

tain tho correct information and proTO Darro's mGrnhorship until January
1945. There was no mistake on the part of tho SS Index I'iling Depart

ment as allogea hy DarreT'' Whether Darre entirely f^pro-ved of Hiimnlcr s
methods in ca.rrying out the policy of tho SS is Incidentc-l to tho f ct

that as an SS momhor he was in raccord with thi5 aims and purposes of the
organization. It is ostablishod in this respect that Darre, in pos
session of all the facts surrounding the SS-Gtjrmcnization Program ..s

conducted in the Eastern Incorporated Territories, did contrihuto^is
sorvicGs in order that tho aims of this program might iJO realized

Concorning Darro'a position of Eoichsloiter and his Office for

/^raxian Policy of tho HSDA? oTldoncG has boon submitted to prove that
during 1937, 1938 and 1939 this office was ospocially active in conduct
ing war preparations through tho Agency of the Office for Pood See i y
(aep n. ^8 ) — office a-lso subordinate to Darre, This office con
tinued in existence until at least 1942 when Backo transferred certain

r

duties of loadership from Main Division I of the ^ich Jiood Bstc.to to

I

tho Roich Office for Agrarian Policy in the ESDAp. Darro doscribnd

position of a Rcichsleitor in tho Third Reich whon ho explained th, t tho
Importance of an individual did not depend upon his title of RoiChsleitor but on tho office thoy filled in tho Party or their position in
tho statOo Ho cited Bormanu, Himmlor, Ley, Schwarz and Lutze as ex

amples of RolchslGitors who were important Iccauso of their offices' in
tho party and Goobbols. Prick, Rosenborg and himself as examples
Reichsloitors who wore in^ortant because of thoir state positi
admits that ho was given leave as a Reichsloitor on 12 May 1942.

2^ Exh, 2525, IIG-1655, DB 106, p. 20;

^ Soo p. 65

for contribution of Rcich Ministry.

^ Exh. 40, Darro Doc. I B 34
^

Tr. 19060

^ Tr. 19063

-
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APPEI^IDIX TO BRIE?

Adju^t_ed_I)ef ense__Appendis; 1
Bread Grain Balance 1939/410

Source_s: lA S, lA 3, lA 4 and lA 5 of the figures on the Germen Ifar
iood Economy

(in thousands of tons)

Countries

Imports (output)

E:cports

Incorporated Eastern

Territories
Slovahria

177
1^9

.

.

Eastern Upper Silesia

19g

Government General

39
306

v/ehrmacht consunrotion!

1192 X 10^

~235"

'

3_2Q
355

Reich Subsidy: 355

n, 30_6

iL9

There v;as actually no Reich subsidy of 49,000 tons in 1939/40, C. 0
177,000 tons supplied hy the Occupied Eastern Temtcries were importo of

I

the Reich Office for Grain, as expressly dated in a footnoteo Hovf Eruca v.as
taken out hy the Armed Ecrces or sold directly to them, is not shown. Eowever, that must have been substantial quantities because the figure for the

folloT-ring year 1940/41 is 415,000 tons. Consequently, neither a subsidy nor

a surplus has been inserted in the sumraary of the bread-grain balances.
A'^J.^sted_p_efens_e_App_endix 2
Bread Grain Balance 1940/41

^ource_E;_IA 3, lA 3, JA 4 and lA 5 of the Figures on the German 'dar
Pood Economy

(m thousands of tons)

Countries

Imports (Output)

Exports

Incorporated Eastern
Territories
Frence

415
550

'

Holland
Government General
Slovakia

1
15
10

.

Eastern Upper Silesia

230

Alsace-Lorraine

Jl-82
991

412""

I'Jehrmacht consvunntion:

1785 X 30^^

^
947

Reich Surplus:

P91
-

947

44-

~
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Bread Grain Balance 1941/42
Source^:_ lA 2, lA 3, lA 4, IA-5 of the Figures on the German V.'ar Food
Eccnoffiiy

(In thousands cf tons)
,

Imports (output)

Countries

Si^Dorts

Incorporated Eastern
territories

896

Prance

485

Holland

2

Gox'ernment General

50

Eussia, Baltic countries
Yugoslavia
Transnistrien "

1267

111

7

Eastern Upper Silesia

265

•

Al sace-Lo rraine

1S5

Carinthiar-Krain

39

Croatia

1

~2818 ~

440

"Ivehrma, "ht ccnsunrotion:

2500 X 60^

1500
1940

1

Heich Surplus:

1

2818

-

n 19i0„

>

•

_

_

Adjusted_liefen_se_i.2pciidix 6

1^1 3ala.nce 1939/40
^ources_: IE 4, IB 5, IE 5 and IE 2 of the Eigures on the G-erman V/ar
Bood Ecsnomy

(In thousands of tons)
Countries

Imports (Outout)

Danzig-'.Iest Prussia/
•'artholand

Eastern Unncr Silosia

P.eich Subsidy

^

86 -

Bxoorts

Adj^Ti5t_ed_I)^fe^ns^e ATypendix _7
Pat Balance 1940/41

Sources: IE 4, IE 5, IB 6 and IE 2 of the Elgures on the Serman
Pood Sconon^

.var

(in thousands of tons)
Countries

iD^orts (Output)

Eastern territories

Esrocrts

8,1
27,7
0,5
30,0
12,2
3,0
15,0

Holland
Prance

ITormy
Alsace

8,4
4,2
1,2
1,0

Lorraine

Luxemhur^

Bansig-h'est Prussia-^'^artheland
Eastern Upper Silesia

16^0_
96,5

Wehrmacht consuiirption:

oO, 8

119 :: 30^.0

36^0_

Heich Surplus:

66,8

96,5
-

66j_8__

29.7

iid_justed__Defense_Appendix 8
Pat Balance 1941/42

f

4,_IE 5, IS 6 and IS 2 of the Pi£ures on the Oerman

$

Jood i'conoiay

'ar

(in thousands of tons)

Countries

Inserts (Output)

Eastern Territories

Bxoorts.

16,3
3,0
25,5
4,4
0,9
0,2
3.7
0,4
0,3
4.8
29,9
4,4
32,5
3,0
5,3

Holland

Hussis a.nd Bs,ltic nations
Prance

Government General
Yugoslavia
Humania
Croatia

Hungary
Yugoslavia
Russia

Holland
Prance

Horvray
G-reece
Alsace
Lorraine

8,0
4,6
4,0
1,2

LoT^er Styria
Danai^Uest Prussia

Eastern Upper Silesia

26,0
_5a.0_
48,8

Uorv/av

132,6

^©hrmacht consum'ption:
149 X 60^

- iOj.0

138,8"

R&ich Subsidy: 138,8
- 132,6

6.S
-

u't

,

87 -
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i:'^A'*^stedJD^fense_A;opendix y.__

Meat_3alance_l£3£/

SouTjce^: IF 3 and IF 1 of the Figures on the G-ernian VJ'ar Food Economy
(In thousands of tons)

Countries

Imports (Output)

Exports

Vrehraacht in occupied

territories, estimated at

150,0

Kastcrn Un-oer Silesia

Reich Surolus:

i

150,0

-

14-7

14,7

150,0
- _14,7

Adju^ted_Iiefen^e_Appendix 12_

Meat__Balance_1940y41_

Source^i IF 3 and IF 1 of the Figures on the German Vfar Food ii^conomy
(in thousands of tons)

Countries

Inserts (Output)

,

Exports

f
0

Eastern Territories

69

France

Belgium

JSIetherlands

"^9

Uorv;ay

®

Government General

9

Protectorate
Serbia

6

_
_
Eastern Upper Silesia

protectorate

Alsace-Lorraine

gg g

- iM "

"

P2*g

Wehrmacht consumption;

^

637 K 30'j

"260,9"

Reich Surplus;

344,0
-

260,9

- -

«

88 -

-

."i
^

^dj_usted_D_efense_Appendix

Keat_Balan^e_19i^43_

Sources,: IP 3 and IP 1 of the Pigures on the G-erman War Pood Sccnoiay
(in thousands of tons)
Countries

Imports (Output)

Eastern Territories

Ssnrcrts

86

Prance

146

ITether-lands

27

Norv/ay

6

Russia

264

Government General

22

Protectorate
Serbia

A

5

Ee.stern Upper Silesia

36,4
12,3
20^5
69,2

Protectorate

Alsace—Lorraine
560

VJehrmacht consumotion:
750 X 60<

_S50j_0_

Reich Surplus:
-

)

519,2'

560,0

iO.8

^19,2

Adj,usted_Defen,S0_Appendix 16_
Pojbe,to_Ba-lance_19o9/40_
IG l, ig 2 and IG 3 of the Pigures on the German Uar Pood
Bconomy

(In'thousands of tons)
Countries

Imports (Output)

Danzig Uost Prussia
"^.'artheland

100
200

South Past Prussia

_30

ij>roorts

330

Reich Surplus:

330

-

89 -

Adju^todJD£fense_Appendix 17_

Po_ta^o_Balanc e_l 9'10/41_
^OT^ce^: IG- 1, IG- 2 and IG- 3 of the S'iguires on the G-erman VJar Food
Sconomy:

(in thousands of tons)

Imports (Output)

CoTintries

Sxroorts

Annexed Sastern
Territories

540

Holland

56

Belgium
ITori/ay

4
17

Government General
Government General

122
36

Holland

22

Belgium

137

Eastern Upper Silesia
Belch Surplus:

_240_
739

739
-

435

"435'
504

Adjusted_B_efen_se__Appcndix 18_

f

Po^a^o_Be1anc c_l£41 / 42_

£ounc_e_s: IG

, IG 3 and IG 3 of the Figures on the German Uar Food

Economy

(in thousands of tons)
Countries

Imports (Output)

Eastern Territories

Bxoorts

814

Holland

90

France

20

ITorway

83

Bussian area

737

Government General
Government General

139
54

Eastern Upper Silesia

240

Alsace
Lorraine

iO
30

Reich Surplus;

1883
~

1883

35-i

354"
1529

-

•tlCTrlia'n«1»A"'' '
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/•.djusted_I)ef^n_se_Appendix 21_
Su^ar Balance

Sourcor:

IH 1 and IK 3 of the Bie;ures on the German

I'ood Bconomy

(in thousands of tons)

Imports (output)

Countries

Eastern Territories

119

Protectorate

166_

Exoorts

285
Uehrmacht

consumption:

315 X lOf;

„31>I

Reich Surplus:

285,0
253,5

n „31,5

Adjust ed_I)^f en^e_Anpendix 22_

Sugar 3alanc_e 19:^/.41
*'•1.

Sources_: IH 1 and IH 3 of the Figures on the German Uar I'ood Econom;""

(In thousands of tons)
Inroorts (Output)

Countries

Eastern Territories
Protectorate

Exports

134
248
1

Hollo-iid

3

Belgium

10

i

1

Government General

5

30_

Eastern Upper Silesia

~ 389 ~
Uehrmacht consunption:

1

20
I

300 X 3Cf.

90

1

110

Reich Surplus:

389

1i

'

n 110

1

1

^'^ji'^stedJD£fen^e__Anpendix 33__
Sugo-r Balance

Source^:

IH 1 and IH 3 of the Figures on the German trar Food Bconomy

(in thousands of tons)

Imports (Output)

Countries

Eastern Territories
protectorate

Holland

160
230
li

Belgium

30

Itassia

43

Serbia

3

47

Eastern Upper Silesia
Styriar-Erain
Uehrraacht consumption:

Exoorts

.

469

350 X 60^'

64

210

374"

Reich Surplus:

169
-

195

274
-

91 -
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